

Transnational Analysis of the Impact of Corruption on Development in Africa: A Review of Literature

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ABSTRACT The study seeks to understand the nexus between corruption and development within Southern Africa. A cross-national analysis of relevant data was constructed to demonstrate the relationship between corruption and regional development. The study highlights the costs of corruption for the region particularly from an economic developmental standpoint. Insights from the study contribute to scholarly debate relating to the ills of corruption and resulted in the development of a framework that might help to reduce the levels of corruption, enhance good governance, and advance sustainable development in the region.

INTRODUCTION

Corruption is described as an intractable global impasse from which no nation or region can justifiably claim any exemption (Agbiboa 2012). Apart from being a moral category signifying putrefaction, corruption is acknowledged by many scholars, to be deleterious to development given its ability to undermine a state's legitimacy, harm private business and victimise citizens (Mbaku 1996; Mauro 1998; Rose-Ackerman 2006; Ryvkin and Serra 2012). Although, some scholars assert that in certain situations, corruption may not necessarily be favourable to development (for example, Braguinsky 1996; Bardhan 1997; Castro et al. 2014), in most cases, corruption negatively affects development. For instance, corruption lowers investment and economic growth (Maunro 1995; Knight 2013). Interestingly, Healy and Ramanna (2013) recently suggested that corruption was cited as the biggest hurdle in business development. In fact, corruption was cited as the "biggest hurdle in Russia, the second biggest in India and the fifth biggest in China and South Africa" (Healy and

Ramanna 2013: 122). Within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, the member states are perceived to be among the generally corrupt countries in the world and corruption is seen as a constraint to investment (Mlambo 2005). This is of particular importance considering the fact that this region suffers from high levels of poverty and uneven distribution of income (Leichenko and O'Brien 2002; Ortiz and Cummins 2011). It is argued that rising corruption increases income inequality and poverty (Gupta et al. 2002). "Popular belief suggests that corruption and poverty are closely related in developing countries" (Chetwynd et al. 2003: 5). However, few studies established a direct relationship between corruption and poverty (Chetwynd et al. 2003; Gupta et al. 2002). Although, "corruption, by itself, does not produce poverty, corruption has rather direct consequences on economic and governance factors, intermediaries that in turn produce poverty" (Chetwynd et al. 2003: 6). Gupta et al. (2002: 24) concurred that "corruption increases poverty by reducing the level of social services available to the poor, creating incentives for higher investment in capital-intensive projects and lower investment in labor-intensive projects". They, further, argued that such bias in investment strategy deprives the poor of income-generating opportunities (Gupta et al. 2002).

While extensive academic research has explored corruption and its undesirable effects on economic development in developing countries,

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particularly in Africa (for example, Mbaku 1996, 2000; Serra 2008; Agbiboa 2012), much less research has investigated the impact of corruption within the SADC region. Attempts to curb corruption within the SADC countries, is not only a moral obligation but is also pertinent to addressing its various negative effects, especially regarding the attainment of the much needed socio-economic development in the region and the entire African continent. Additionally, it is important to continuously explore corruption in the SADC region and how this impacts on the specific nature of contemporary African states, together with the depth of the crisis which affects them (De Sardan 1999). Consequently, many states, regional bodies, as well as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) around the globe have now committed themselves to fighting global corruption. "Governments in Southern Africa have enacted legislation and codes of conduct, established anti-corruption institutions, reformed processes of governance to minimize opportunities for corruption and undertaken national consultative processes to design anti-corruption strategies" (Kututwa and Kunaka 2002: 23). Additionally, the Human Rights Trust of Southern Africa, developed anti-corruption mechanisms and strategies for dealing with corruption in Southern Africa (Kunaka 2010). In fact, the SADC 2001 Protocol against Corruption is an example of such a mechanism. Kututwa and Kunaka (2002) concur that the SADC Protocol Against Corruption is an indication of a growing political will to fight corruption. Similarly, global institutions such as Transparency International (TI) and the World Bank are championing the war against corruption. Against this backdrop, the study ultimately attempts to use extant literature to critically analyse the problem of corruption within the SADC region with the particular objective of revealing its growing trend and its impacts on the region's development. The study underscores the importance of a deeper comprehension of the state of corruption in the SADC region and recommends alternative ways of controlling corruption within the region.

The rest of the paper is organised as follows: First, the extant literature on corruption is reviewed (that is, the definition of corruption, the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), the irresistible nature of corruption, the implication of corruption, and the SADC Protocol Against Cor-

ruption). This is followed by a description of the research methods used for the study. The results of the study are then discussed. Finally, implications and directions for future research are presented.

Literature Review

Understanding Corruption

Studies relating to corruption have tended to err on the side of caution "in interpreting the empirical results given the nature of the definition of corruption" (Saha et al. 2012:1). Scholars have long acknowledged that defining corruption is an arduous task due to the polyvalent and elusive nature of the concept (Bardhan 1997; Agbiboa 2012). In fact, "given the clandestine nature, corruption is intrinsically a complex phenomenon and hard to measure due to its actual and perceived notions" (Saha et al. 2012: 1). For instance, there is the inherent challenge of non-translatability across culture, whereby an act deemed corrupt in one culture or society may be considered as moral in another (Bardhan 1997; Treisman 2000; De Maria 2009; Lee and Weng 2013) due to cultural relativism (issues of morals). Bukuluki (2013: 29) argue that "the drivers and manifestations of corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) cannot be understood without reference to the socio-cultural context of collectivism". In addition, corruption is an adaptive phenomenon due to its omnipresence at all level of government, society and organizations, and the non-linearity of its consequences (Habtemichael and Cloete 2010). Accordingly, a level of circumspection is required in analysing corruption. Nonetheless, any policy aimed at addressing the indisputable problem of corruption ought to be anchored on some tangible understanding of the given concept, if it is to be efficacious. Corruption pertains to the abuse of authority for private benefits, both pecuniary and non-pecuniary (Ampratwum 2008). Similarly, corruption can be interpreted as misusing public office (or even resources) to realize a private gain/benefit (World Bank 2000; Bukuluki 2013).

The commonality across these various definitions is the notion of abuse or misuse of public resources or office for personal gain. Corruption occurs as a form of behavior violating the official ethics of public service (Park and Blen-

kinsopp 2011) and involves the abuse of power (Coetzer and Snell 2013). However, corruption is not entirely limited to the public domain as indicated in the above definitions. Corruption is equally rife in the private sectors (Bardhan 1997; Park and Blenkinsopp 2011; Montiel et al. 2012). Moreover, questions regarding what are appositely deemed as private gains or when such private gains by public officers should be seen as corruption or not, can also be raised. For instance, when an official is not seeking his/her own personal gain but rather a benefit for political supporters, or when he/she actually enjoys personal gain that does not have consequences for policy outcomes, we may not consider such private gain as corruption (Johnson 2004; Agbi-boa 2012). Besides, one needs to consider both the motive of the official as well as the outcomes of his/her action. From a broader perspective, corruption can also be defined as “behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence” (Nye 1967: 419; Park and Blenkinsopp 2011: 255). Such behaviour could include “bribery (use of reward to pervert the judgment of a person in a position of trust), nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reason of inscriptive relationship rather than merit) and misappropriation” (Nye 1967). Barker and Carter (1994) state that corruption contains three elements: violations of law, rules, regulations, or ethical standards; misuse of an officer’s position; and acceptance of some actual or expected material reward or gain. Regardless of its forms, corruption undermines services delivery to the people and it decreases confidence in the public sector (Park and Blenkinsopp 2011: 255). Rose-Ackerman (1999:9) wraps up the definition succinctly by stating that corruption is “a symptom that something has gone wrong in the management of the state”. Hence, corruption is likely to be greater in countries where there are problems of regulatory and institutional inefficiency. As a working definition for the study, Nye’s (1967) conceptualisation of corruption, although not immune to the limitations acknowledged above, *inter alia*, is endorsed.

Corruption Perception Index (CPI)

Transparency International’s (TI) Corruption Perception Index (CPI) or the corruption index

of the PRS Group, the International Country Risk Guide, are routinely interpreted as measures of perceptions of corruption or the experience of corruption. The CPI is one of the various tools used to assess the level of corruption around the world. Transparency International’s cross-country analysis of the perception of corruption in different countries around the world focuses on the corrupt activities of public officials, civil servants or politicians, that is, the administrative and political aspects of corruption (Transparency International: Online). Its data sources relate to the abuse of power and it focuses on questions concerning the embezzlement of public funds, bribery of public officials, kickbacks in public procurement, as well as on questions that assess the effectiveness and strength of anti-corruption efforts in the public sector. Countries are rated on the scale of 0 to 10, with zero (0) indicating the countries perceived to be highly corrupt, while ten (10) indicated countries perceived to have the least corruption. In calculating the index, the scores of countries for the specific corruption-related questions in the data sources are combined to calculate a single score for each country (Transparency International: Online). The CPI has been criticised on grounds of reliability and objectivity given its reliance on corruption perception rather than corruption *per se* (Transparency International: Online). As a result it is seen as subjective and it is not immune to biases. However, it is widely used in corruption analysis around the world as it is believed to have some level of reliability due, among other reasons, to its correlation with other measurements as well as its convergence with other measurements in predicting economic growth. Suffice to note that given its clandestine nature, corruption hardly lends itself to any objective measurement (Treisman 2000). Accordingly, this analysis is still based on perceptions of corruption in the meantime.

The Irresistible Nature of Corruption

The Indian philosopher Kautilya Arthushastra (cited in Choudhary 2011:67), acknowledged the irresistible nature of corruption within government as he suggested that “just as it is impossible not to taste the honey or poison that one may find at the tip of one’s tongue, so it is impossible for one dealing with government funds not to taste, at least a little bit, of the king’s

wealth". Thus, professionals who are charged with the duty of upholding justice are themselves culprits guilty of corrupt activities. For instance, the former Bellville District Court prosecutor of Cape Town, South Africa, (name withheld) who was tried in November 2012 on charges of corruption, theft and defeating the ends of justice, revealed how endemic corruption can be (News24 2012). Such cases are arguably not uncommon in other SADC countries as indicated by the higher ranking of most African countries in the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of TI. Similarly, in many countries the police have become the emblem of corruption as they use force to extort money from the people rather than fulfilling their mandate of enforcing law and order. For instance, the "Zimbabwe Republic Police is rated as one of the country's most visible corrupt organizations in Zimbabwean government with its traffic section being one of the worst in SADC in terms of corruption" (Transparency International Online). Transparency International, further, argued that the rate of corruption has become so cancerous that it has extended to the most junior office bearers in the public service. Corruption is basically considered irresistible, according to Agbese (1992), who posits that it is debatably an intrinsic part of human nature. Such views of corruption correspond with the political realists' school of thought. However, there is an opposing view from the school of political idealism that suggests that human nature is perfectible and therefore offers a glimmer of hope against the world of corruption. Arguably, on such assumptions hinge the different anti-corruption strategies aiming at alleviating corruption in the world. Whilst corruption in SADC may take long to eradicate, it is controllable and ought to be controlled given its negative effects.

Implications of Corruption

The deleterious effects of corruption have been acknowledged globally (Lambsdorff 2006; Choudhary 2011; Ryvkin and Serra 2012). As a result, Transparency International (TI), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other major international institutions, have made combating corruption a central institutional priority. For instance, TI launched the Integrity Awards in 2000 to honour remarkable individuals and organisations worldwide (including journalists,

public prosecutors, government officials and civil society leaders) that are fighting fearlessly against corruption (Transparency International Online). Launched in 2000, the Integrity Awards have honoured remarkable individuals and organisations worldwide, including journalists, public prosecutors, government officials and civil society leaders. Launched in 2000, the Integrity Awards have honoured remarkable individuals and organisations worldwide, including journalists, public prosecutors, government officials and civil society leaders. Ampratwum (2008) observed the wastefulness of corruption in relation to foreign aid to poor countries and that it hampers the poverty reduction objectives of such assistance. Similarly, former United Nations (UN) Secretary General, Kofi Annan, aptly underscores that "corruption is an insidious plague that has a wide range of corrosive effects on societies as it undermines democracy and the rule of law, leads to violations of human rights, distorts markets, erodes the quality of life, and allows organised crime, terrorism and other threats to human security to flourish" (quoted in Ampratwum 2008: 77). This destructiveness is due to the fact that corruption generally militates against all facets of growth and development (for example, economic, social, technological and cultural) by breeding political instability, social unrest, inefficient and incompetent administration, mediocrity, and unethical values such as greediness, in most corrupt countries. The putrid economic state of Nigeria is a classic example. Despite its abundant natural endowments, Nigeria features among the top fifty poorest nations in the world (Pasquali 2014). Interestingly, Kneller and Haque (2009) aptly emphasise that there is a strong negative correlation between corruption and economic development, such that countries that remain trapped in high levels of corruption record significantly low levels of development. Similarly, countries that experience low levels of corruption tend to progress in most areas of development.

On the contrary, Rashid (1981) and Seyf (2001) argued that corruption is desirable as long as it is kept within acceptable limits. They further argue that corruption is used as a mechanism for accessing crucial resources on the basis of a willingness and ability to pay a premium. However, the challenge is when the premium is exorbitant, and motivated by self-interest and greed. Similarly, Seyf (2001: 599) and Johnson

(1975: 53) postulate that “if bribe takers belong to an entrepreneurial class and these entrepreneurs invest a significant fraction of the corruption revenue in highly productive activities with significant backward and forward linkages, the growth effects would be highly favorable”. These scholars are of the view that there are some positive economic impacts associated with corruption. Despite these debatable economic benefits of corruption, the practice promotes inefficiency and a significant waste of resources at the micro-economic level. The economic gap that exists between the rich and poor in many African countries, the SADC region included, confirms such views. The state of affairs in most African countries suggested that corruption is not of much benefit, if any, at all. Compared to the other regions of the world, Sub-Saharan Africa, of which SADC is part, generally lags behind in development partially due to pervasive corruption (Agbibo 2012). Although, Africa does not have the monopoly on corruption as such, it is still one of the developing economies, which has corruption as its major developmental challenge (Nwabuzor 2005). Therefore, due to lack of effective anti-corruption apparatus compared to other regions of the world, it is imperative that we underscore the challenge that corruption poses to development in Africa with special reference to the SADC region. Corruption has simply become a way of life in many Sub-Saharan African countries as “to wander through the corridors of power in these countries is to wander through a whispering-gallery of gossip, in which the fact of corruption at the highest levels is taken utterly for granted, and the only interest lies in capping the latest story with one that is even more startling” (Bayley 1996: 723).

SADC Protocol against Corruption

The indubitable widespread corruption, for instance in the SADC region, engendered the SADC Protocol Against Corruption adopted in Malawi in 2001, in which all the SADC member states agreed to adopt a regional approach towards fighting corruption, bearing in mind its cross-border negative impacts on both national and regional development (Goredema 2001). The threefold purposes of this regional initiative are: (1) to promote the development of anti-corruption mechanisms at the national level; (2) to pro-

mote cooperation in the fight against corruption by the member states; and (3) to harmonise anti-corruption national legislation in the region (Goredema 2001). The importance of such regional and political will towards corruption control, arguably hinges on the transnational outlook of regional development as the likelihood of a country influencing the level of corruption in neighbouring countries is important. For instance, within SADC, Zimbabwe was rated as one of the least transparent countries, and Botswana as one of the most transparent countries. Such ranking has significant implications for the level of political and economic development. For instance, it is argued that there is negative correlation between corruption and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Gross Domestic Product (GDP), inter alia (Mauro 1996). According to Mlambo (2005), corruption is generally recorded as a critical obstacle to FDI inflows in Africa. He further argued, that “foreign investors are generally averse to corruption in host countries” (Mlambo 2005). “Corruption adds to the cost of business transactions which often leads to inefficient economic outcomes and thus has a negative overall impact on economic growth” (Mlambo 2005: 568). Hence, certain countries in the region, such as Zimbabwe, which are perceived to be highly corrupt, recorded less FDI compared to Botswana in the same year, partly due to the impact of corruption. According to the Human Rights Trust of Southern Africa (SAHRIT), the results of studies conducted in 2000 analysing the seriousness of corruption in the SADC region, revealed that the majority (75%) of the respondents perceived corruption as a problem. When comparing different continents, the majority (87%) believed that corruption is a problem throughout the African continent, while 42% of the respondents believed that Europe and America have low levels of corruption (cited in Zvekic 2002). Albeit that the SADC region still remains the most transparent in Sub-Saharan Africa (Agbibo 2012), the urgency and importance of effective implementation of the protocol against corruption cannot be undermined if the region is to develop politically, economically and otherwise.

Meanwhile, as Olowu (1993: 227) aptly observes, “one of the reasons why governmental corruption has grown to be pervasive in Africa today is primarily because much effort has been spent to remedy the problem rather than to un-

Table 1: Key findings from the literature

<i>Topic</i>	<i>Author (s)</i>	<i>Findings</i>
<i>Perception of Corruption Within SADC Region</i>	Transparency International (Online) Asiedu (2002)	Indicates the perception of corruption in SADC countries for various years. Using panel data for 22 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa over the period 1984–2000, corruption is found to be a significant determinant of the level of FDI inflow alongside other variables, such as human capital, natural resources, market size, physical infrastructure, the host country's investment policies, the reliability of the host country's legal system, and political instability.
	Mbaku (2000)	A comprehensive study of corruption in Africa reveals its pervasive nature around the continent as well as the futility of anti-corruption campaign.
<i>Causes and Effect of Corruption in the SADC Region</i>	Ampratwum (2008)	Accentuates the wastefulness of corruption based on a review of wide range of published materials. The study brings to the fore the thwarting effects of corruption with regard to common poverty reduction goals of both donor agencies and aid recipient countries.
	Serra (2008)	The study indicates that corruption is lower in richer countries where democratic institutions have been preserved for a long continuous period, and the population is mainly Protestant. Similarly corruption is higher in countries where political instability is the major problem. Additionally, a country's colonial heritage appears to be a significant determinant of present corruption.
	Mlambo (2005)	In trying to assessing the determinants of FDI inflow in SADC region, corruption is found to be a major variable. Hence, efforts at regional level to promote FDI must be cognisant of the significance of corruption.
	Zvekic (2002)	Assesses the SADC regional effort at quelling the tide of corruption, noting some of the current challenges and way forward.
	Wie (2000)	It discusses corruption and the major ills of society. The study also highlights the importance of law enforcement in dealing with corruption.
	Treisman (2000)	Critically speculates the negative effects of corruption on efficiency and growth and further notes the importance of administrative reforms as it pertains to corruption control.
	Bardhan (1997)	Based on corruption perception indexes generated from business risk surveys conducted during the 1980s and 1990s, the author explores the variances in the level of corruption from country to country. The author found that protestant traditions, histories of British rule, more developed economies and long exposure to democracy, inter alia, to be explanatory factors behind the minimal level of corruption in certain countries and vice versa.
	Mauro (1996)	Observes the distorting effect of corruption on government expenditure among other ills of corruption.
	Nye (1967)	In a cost-benefit analysis of corruption the author highlights among other issues, the deleterious effects of corruption in less developed economies as compared to more developed countries.
<i>Control of Corruption</i>	Agbiboa (2012)	Critically analyses the problem of corruption in Nigeria and underscores the importance of economic and legal reforms in stemming the tide.
	Myint (2000)	Stresses the need to prioritise the problem of corruption in the development agenda by discussing the cause and consequence for least developed countries. Salient thoughts are presented on ways of keeping corruption at bay.
	Mbaku (1996)	Critically examines the problem of endemic corruption in Africa and puts forward the public choice approach as the most effective and intellectually satisfying framework for corruption clean-up.

Source: Authors' compilation

derstand it". Knowing the root causes of corruption is essential to developing anti-corruption strategies that are not merely rhetorical but are pragmatically effective. Subsequently in this paper, we therefore look at the causes of corruption in the region, which seems not to have been given much attention in existing literature. Suffice to state that the various causative factors of corruption around the world, particularly in developing economies, find congruencies in the SADC region and that such factors could include, inter alia, geography and history, regulatory quality, size of the public sector/population, lack of economic competition, government structure, voting system, and cultural values (Rose-Ackerman 2006). Some of the key findings from the literature are displayed in Table 1.

The methodology used for this study is discussed next.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The study critically reviews secondary sources as a data collection method. These secondary sources include newspapers, SADC reports on corruption, Transparency International's annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI), data sets and the SADC Protocol Against Corruption, inter alia. The secondary data are firstly identified in view of their relevance to the issue of corruption, and insights were drawn from a mosaic of secondary sources to address both the primary and secondary objectives of this particular study. Transparency International's Global Corruption reports are used in this paper to compare the extent and trend of corruption within the SADC Region. Then various apt inferences are drawn, which serve as the bases for policy recommendations.

The use of secondary sources is consistent with growing trends in the discipline of international development (Ahamada and Coulibaly 2012; French et al. 2013; Kasuga 2012). Insights from secondary data sources have not yet been deeply explored. Given this background, this study focusses on exploring data sources relating to corruption within the African context, with special reference to the SADC region.

Considering the covert nature of corruption, access to primary data through interviews is difficult. While acknowledging the missing enrichment that such data could have brought to this study, the use of secondary data facilitates a

wide range of interpretive practices to glean a better understanding of the subject matter (Brummer 2005; Welman et al. 2007). A non-systematic method of data collection is used for the purpose of convenience and time saving. The other reasons behind the use of secondary data for this project, include the advantages that secondary data offer in terms of reduction in expenditure on data collection, which also facilitates an immediate commencement of data analysis; saving time; as well as the superiority of the quality of some data in comparison to what the researchers could have created alone (Thomas 2004). Nonetheless, in general, the secondary data has its own limitations, which may include the danger of out-of-context interpretation, due to lack of suitability and the relevance of the collected data to this project, since certain data may have been collected by others with a different focus, as well as the difficulty in seeing the weak points of such data or information used (Thomas 2004). However, the critical review of a wide range of sources in this study is particularly geared towards addressing such lapses. There is no ethical issue raised by this method of data collection as effort has been made to conceal an individual's identity where corruption incidences are cited for clarity. Emerging from the above are three key themes that form the crux of our subsequent analysis, these are (1) perception of corruption in SADC; (2) causes of corruption; and (3) costs of corruption.

RESULTS

Perceptions of Corruption in SADC

Corruption is widespread, although, it varies in seriousness from country to country within the SADC region. Table 2 reveals a growing trend of corruption within the SADC region with just above one third of SADC countries (Lesotho, Mauritius and Seychelles) moving, albeit unimpressively slowly, towards the objective of the protocol, that is, transparency amongst member countries. The remaining nine countries are still soiled by endemic corruption, without much improvement over the years, leaving the average trend as negative.

Drawing from Table 2, a positive trend in the index indicates that the country in question is improving in terms of transparency, and vice versa. For instance, in the year 2000, Angola's

Table 2: Corruption Index within the SADC Region 2000-2010

Country	2000		2004		2006		2008		2009		2010		Trend
	Index	Rank	Index	Rank	Index	Rank	Index	Rank	Index	Rank	Index	Rank	
Angola	1.7	85	2.0	129	2.2	142	1.9	158	1.9	162	1.9	168	+
Botswana	6.0	26	6.0	29	5.6	37	5.8	36	5.6	37	5.8	33	-
DRC	n/a	n/a	2.0	133	2.0	156	1.6	171	1.9	162	2.0	164	-
Lesotho	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	3.2	92	3.3	89	5.8	78	+
Madagascar	n/a	n/a	3.1	82	3.1	84	3.4	85	3.0	99	2.6	123	+
Malawi	4.1	43	2.8	90	2.7	105	2.8	115	3.3	89	3.4	85	-
Mauritius	4.7	37	4.1	54	5.1	42	5.5	41	5.4	42	5.8	39	+
Mozambique	2.2	81	2.8	90	2.8	99	2.6	126	2.5	130	2.7	116	+
Namibia	5.4	30	4.51	54	4.1	55	4.5	61	4.5	56	4.4	56	-
S/Africa	5.0	34	4.6	44	4.6	51	4.9	54	4.7	55	4.5	54	-
Seychelles	n/a	n/a	4.4	48	3.6	63	4.8	55	4.8	54	4.8	49	+
Swaziland	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	3.6	72	3.6	79	3.2	91	-
Tanzania	2.5	76	2.8	90	2.9	93	3.0	102	2.6	126	2.7	116	-
Zambia	3.6	57	2.6	102	2.8	111	2.4	115	3.0	99	3.0	101	-
Zimbabwe	3.0	65	2.3	124	2.4	130	1.8	166	2.2	146	2.4	134	-
Average (approx.)	3.9		3.5		3.4		3.5		3.5		3.7		-

Note: *CPI score ranges between zero and 10, with zero reflecting the highest level of corruption.

Source: Adapted from Transparency International (TI) (2000-2010)

corruption index was 1.7 and 1.9 in the year 2010. This implies that Angola has improved in transparency; hence, the corruption level in Angola is declining. On the other hand, Botswana has a corruption index of 6 and 5.8 in 2010. This indicates that Botswana's corruption index has declined, implying that the country's transparency levels have not improved. The average corruption index for the SADC region declined from 3.9 in 2000 to 3.5 and 3.4 in 2004 and 2006, respectively. During the year 2008 and 2009, the corruption index remained constant at 3.5. In 2010, the index increased to 3.7 indicating an improvement in transparency levels within the SADC region. Overall, during the ten-year period (2000 – 2010) the trend shows that the corruption index has declined from 3.9 to 3.7, showing a negative trend. This negative trend indicates that the level of corruption has increased. This calls for an urgent need to find ways of dealing with corruption in the region.

The various examples of corruption in the SADC region include, inter alia: family promotion, nepotism, tender procurement, and bribe taking by police people. The major categories of corruption in Africa, of which SADC is part, include political and bureaucratic corruption, which is sometimes referred to as “big and petty” corruption, respectively. Although not limited to pecuniary private benefits, corruption in Africa is mostly in monetary terms. Despite Zimbabwe having the Prevention of Corruption Act, “Pres-

ident Mugabe is quoted as having said he suspects that some of his cabinet ministers are corrupt, although, nothing was been done since this admission” (Kutukwa and Kunaka 2010: 18). Similarly, Wafawarova (2011) noted that more than forty Zimbabwean House of Assembly members are facing prosecution for allegedly diverting part of their US\$50,000 allocation for the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) to personal benefits. Such occurrences are arguably not uncommon in other SADC countries but this paper cannot provide exhaustive case-to-case analysis thereof. This, however, calls for a concerted effort to prioritise the fight against corruption in the region.

Zimbabwe appears to be advancing towards a cleaner rating in recent years (2009/10) compared to 2008, a period marked by political and social upheaval in the state, which seems to confirm the relationship between corruption and political stability. Meanwhile, the index for Seychelles has remained almost constant, with a mode of 4.8 for the most part. And South Africa, despite being the strongest economy in the region, seems to be losing the upper hand in the battle against corruption. According to TI (2011), 70% of people believe that the government's crackdown on corruption in South Africa has been effective. However, such views tend to contradict the worsening trend of the corruption index, which highlights the incongruence between corruption perception and people's di-

rect experience of it. In South Africa, the police sector is perceived to be the most affected by corruption with a ranking of 4.4 out of 5, followed by political parties ranked 3.9 out of 5 (Transparency International Online). Interestingly, the military, which emblemises corruption in most African states post-independence, happens to be the least corrupt, ranking 2.4 of 5 in South Africa (Transparency International Online). If after a decade after its initiation, corruption is still on the rise, then the SADC Protocol Against Corruption is likely to be rendered superfluous. The discrepancies in the level of corruption among SADC member states, suggested that the anticipated goal of the Protocol still remains a dream in the pipeline and thus requires greater efforts to realise its objectives.

Corruption in Africa

There are numerous factors determining corruption in the SADC region. These factors are a meld of political, economic, social, legal, historical, institutional, as well as cultural factors. As a part of Africa, a cultural factor such as the collectivist worldview of Africans is certainly a determinant of corruption in the SADC region. For instance, according to Madunagu's (1982) observation, the expectation of a strong sense of obligation towards one's community in Africa is implied, and the higher one ascends the social ladder, for instance in government, the more one is expected (or pressurized) to be of benefit to relatives, family and friends by offering gifts such as money, jobs, and providing access to amenities. The group-oriented worldview of Africans and the strong sense of obligation to family, ethnic group, as well as to friends, political allies and cronies, tend often to undermine the individual's sense of accountability and commitment to the public, resulting in bureaucratic corruption in the form of nepotism and favoritism, for example (Alam 1989; Mbaku 1996; Agbibo 2012).

Further, the poor quality of institutions and public sector operation in many of the SADC member states are arguably responsible for the rise in the level of corruption (Salinas-Jiménez and Salinas-Jiménez 2007). Some scholars (for example, Jain 2001; Bliss and Di Tella 2007), who have undertaken empirical exploratory work relating to the field of corruption, have also alluded to the role of excessive discretionary power

accorded to public officials in explaining the causes of corruption. Historical legacies and geographical factors also ultimately determine corruption to a large extent (Goel and Nelson 1998). For instance, in South Africa, the asymmetric income distribution can prompt the disadvantaged to engage in illicit activities in order to better their living standard. Linked to this is also the problem of low wages, which is usually adduced as the major cause of corruption in Africa. From a legal perspective, bureaucratic corruption results from excessive government control and regulation of economic activities, because on the one hand, such regulations once enacted serve as tools for manipulating government with a view to self-gain by certain political coalitions, who then redistribute government wealth in their favour (Mbaku 1996).

Further, draconian government regulations imposed on business propel entrepreneurs to minimise costs by greasing the palms of members of the law enforcement community in order to be allowed to bypass constraining rules and procedures (Ampratwum 2008). Thus, researchers have shown that economic freedom is negatively correlated with corruption (Agbibo 2012). Similarly, tax systems and the organisation of tax-auditing services in a country are also a major determinant of corruption (Lalountas et al. 2011).

Governmental systems also determine corruption levels in a country (Emerson 2006). For example, if the penalty system for punishing corrupt individuals is weak and the chances of being caught and brought to book is low, then people are likely to be willing to engage in corrupt activities. Additionally, a democratic government that promotes a free and independent media is more favourable in fighting corruption than an autocracy, which often silences whistle blowers. One can consider the role of the former apartheid regime in the promotion of corruption in South Africa, bearing in mind the unequal wealth distribution and the consequential poverty created by the regime.

Cost of Corruption

It is both empirically and theoretically evident that corruption is a colossal opponent of development around the world (Mbaku 1996, 2000; Asiedu 2002; León et al. 2013) and the SADC region is no exception. The growing rate

of corruption in the region has largely been responsible for distortions in government expenditure, as money allocated for public development is often diverted into private pockets. A negative correlation is found existing between corruption and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (Aleksynska and Havrylchyk 2013; Mironov 2014). Given its surreptitious and uncertain nature, corruption tends to discourage investors from a country perceived to be highly corrupt. Further, given the contribution of FDI to economic development through “an inflow of capital, tax revenues, and employment, and indirectly through spillover of the foreign investor’s technology and knowledge to local enterprises and workers, and through access to foreign markets” (Reiter and Steensma 2010: 1679), its inadequacy or total absence due to corruption negatively affects the development of the SADC region. Similarly, since a negative relationship is found to exist between GDP per capita and corruption (La Porta et al. 1999; Treisman 2000), the social and economic cost of the latter is manifested in the unprecedented rise in poverty levels and unemployment. In short, there seems to be a general consensus amongst scholarly researchers that corruption is one of the major factors behind the ills of poverty and general underdevelopment in most African states (Mbaku 2000; Ampratwum 2008; Agbibo 2012), which is also true of the SADC region. Other negative impacts of corruption include environmental damage as well as facilitating organised crimes.

DISCUSSION

Toward a Model of Transparency in Combating Corruption

The available prescribed strategies for controlling corruption around the world, within the current literature, relates to the promotion of good leadership and governance (Myint 2000), institutional, legal and economic reform, and economic freedom (Nwabuzor 2005; Agbibo 2012). While these prescriptions are as applicable to the SADC region as they are to other regions of the world, they must be applied appropriately, taking into consideration their particular relevance within a given SADC country. Besides, the validity of the strategy depends largely on to what degree the causes are deciphered in a

given region. Hence, a framework (as indicated by Fig. 1) is adopted to show that the effectiveness of any anti-corruption initiatives, for instance the SADC Protocol Against Corruption, is largely dependent on its root causes. Thus, anti-corruption measures as well as researchers on corruption in the SADC region ought to focus ultimately on the causes of corruption, if the region is to attain the level of administrative transparency required for socio-economic development. For instance, to effectively control corruption in the region, emphasis must be placed on the root causes of corruption, particularly issues such as poverty and greed. Besides, the root causes ought to be adequately deciphered and well integrated into any anti-corruption efforts in the region that aim to succeed.

Figure 1 stresses the significance for more scholarly research to be undertaken relating to this field, with particular focus on the unique root causes of corruption in the individual member states of the SADC region. Such research will help to produce tangible empirical results that can be clearly interpreted. Doing so requires the use of well-protected whistle blowers, who would disclose incidences of corrupt practices wherever noticed, and by so doing enhance the formation of anti-corruption strategies. Observably from Figure 1, a bidirectional relationship can be seen to exist between anti-corruption strategies and whistle blowing as well as between uses of information technology and anti-corruption strategies, indicating that one influences other. Transparency and development are realisable in the process. The use of information systems and technology, especially the internet, is crucial not only in disclosing corrupt activities but also in educating people about anti-corruption programmes and in communicating information with regards to the penalty for alleged corruption. Social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, among others, may facilitate easy communication of such information regarding corruption, given that many subscribers are more faithful to social media than to reading newspapers. Websites can be created for people to share their daily experiences of corruption, thus enabling researchers to decipher the causes of corruption and, thereby, work towards increasing the level of transparency and accountability required for the development of the SADC region. Meanwhile, a level of transparency and development once attained, could equally also




Fig. 1. Corruption trends in selected Countries of SADCC (2000-2010)

influence the effectiveness of whistle blowing, as well as the promotion of further development of information systems and technology, as indicated by the bidirectional arrows between the two, respectively. Overall, the effectiveness of this complex relationship in curbing corruption is dependent upon the degree to which each part is anchored on a true knowledge of the root causes of corruption in the SADC region.

Corruption is unfavourable to development in the SADC region as it is everywhere; hence, the importance of the SADC Protocol Against Corruption. While appreciative of the Protocol as well as the driving political will of SADC member states to tackle corruption regionally, it is observable from the forgoing that there is a lack of unison in corruption control as indicated by the discrepant level of transparency in the region. Of course, one significant lesson that can be learnt from these discrepancies is that while the regional body may provide the framework for combating corruption, the onus is on individual member states to implement such a framework in order to ensure the realisation of its ob-

jective. Hence, cognizant of the fact that the control of corruption is not a walk in park, this paper recommends that more efforts should be placed on research aimed at determining the particular and unique causes of corruption in the region, as this is tantamount to finding a viable regional solution to the impasse. One cannot generalise the causes of corruption as though its impetuses are the same everywhere. While similarities in the causative factors of corruption around the world abound, it is worthwhile investigating any uniqueness to a particular region or nation apropos of these determining factors. This helps to establish region-relevant anti-corruption strategy, given the nonexistence of effective solutions.

CONCLUSION

Whilst this research underscores and emphasises the ills of corruption similarly to other scholarly writings within the field, the focus of this study is on the SADC region, demonstrating the growing trend of corruption within the

region and its associated impacts on the holistic socio-economic development of the region. Having explored the ills of corruption in the region, we have to emphasise that the SADC Protocol Against Corruption is very critical to the development of the SADC region, but only to the degree that it effectively tackles the issue of corruption. Given the general causes of corruption outlined we suggest that beside these causes, the specific causes of corruption within the region must be subject to thorough and region-specific investigation in order to comprehend and develop strategies that will tackle it. More importantly, the causes of corruption within SADC are likely to be culturally and locality specific. Issues such as income distribution in society, level of poverty, level of impunity enjoyed by public officials, among others, need to be explored at regional level if corruption is to be evenly controlled.

RECOMMENDATIONS

From the evidence outlined within this study, the researchers suggest that the region ought to prioritise research focused on unveiling the specific causes of corruption in individual nations within the SADC region. This will help to guard against prescribing a procrustean solution at the regional level that may not be effective. There is need for more efforts towards the control of corruption in the SADC region. Future research should explore different mechanisms for naming and shaming corrupt business practices; corrupt public officials; and corrupt practices in the private sector. Such research is pertinent to finding a lasting control of the menace and hence help giving a voice to the general public, some of whom are driven into poverty and destitution by corruption. Similarly, future research can also look more closely at the qualitative insights from Transparency International so that the specific details of corruption within a given country can be put into the public domain, as a means of giving a voice to the voiceless. Initiatives such as these are prerequisites for changing the lives of millions of people living in poverty as a result of corruption within society and lack of economic development, particularly within the SADC region. It is the researcher's view that the policy makers should take a firm stand on how corrupt citizens should be punished. This punishment should be appli-

cable to every citizen regardless of their status and connections within the society. In other words, the laws designed to punish corrupt individuals should be uniform across all levels of the society. Again, it is crucial for the rule of law to be enforced in all SADC countries so that it will be easier to deal with corruption. Thus, the role of national governments within SADC is to find a suitable and sustainable balance between regional development and protecting the region from external pressures, including corruption.

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