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Neuroscientific Contextualization of Conscious Experience and Its Philosophical Implication

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ABSTRACT This paper makes a significant contribution to the debate on the nature of conscious experience as caused, or not caused, by external objects by providing further arguments for the position that perceptual objects are determined by the causal antecedents of our perceptual experience. This paper shows that it is wrong to seek for a theory of mind purely on a priori ground, and in the same vein, psychologists and neuroscientists are guilty of thinking that they could account for perceptual awareness of physical objects in terms of brain functions or identification of neural correlates of conscious experience alone. While acknowledging the fact that the explanation of the relation between physical objects and their qualities involves a priori consideration, the fact also remains that physical descriptions of conscious experience cannot be ruled out. Neither a descriptive nor a priori method of explanation of the relation between physical objects and their qualities suffices when conceived exclusively of each other.