

Globalization and Religion The Emergence of Fundamental Movements

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ABSTRACT Globalization broadly refers to the condition of complex connectivity evident in the world today, seen in terms of both the compression of the world and the intensification of global consciousness. Some theorists hold that Globalization has been occurring throughout history, only its form has changed over the different historical periods. Sociologists of the classical period had identified globalizing solvents in terms of capitalist commodification (Marx), differentiation (Durkheim) and rationalization (Weber). In contemporary sociological theory, Globalization is seen largely through the mediating category of Modernity (Robertson, Giddens, Wallerstein). Religion has played a significant role in the process of Globalization, initially through the expansion of the world religions of Islam and Christianity, and later through the secularization processes in Protestantism. Recent developments are however challenging the secularization thesis. What is instead being observed is the resurgence of religion in terms of what are being generally called Fundamentalist movements. These Fundamentalist Movements can be categorized into (a) the emergence of New Religious Movements and (b) the wave of Religious Nationalist movements. Niklas Luhmann holds that the globalization of society, while structurally favouring privatization of religion, provides fertile ground for the renewed public influence of religion. What is the future role of religion in society?

I GLOBALIZATION

Just as post-modernism was the concept of the 1980s, 'Globalization' could be called the concept of the 1990s. It had begun to replace terms like 'internationalization' and 'transnationalization' as a more suitable concept for describing the ever intensifying networks of cross-border human interaction (Hoogvelt, 1997:114). Globalization referred to an empirical condition of the complex connectivity evident everywhere in the world in recent times. Complex connectivity involved overcoming cultural distances through penetrating experiences provided through education, employment,

consumer culture and the mass media and had been described as being more significant than technological advances and physical mobility (Tomlinson, 1999: 32).

Held, McGrew and others were of the view that Globalization was neither a wholly novel, nor primarily a modern social phenomenon, only its form had changed over time and across the key domains of human interaction. However, although important continuities with previous phases of Globalization existed, contemporary patterns of Globalization constituted a distinctive historical form which was itself a product of a unique conjuncture of social, political, economic and technological forces. They had presented a fourfold periodization of Globalization: Pre-Modern, Early Modern, Modern and Contemporary.

In the Pre-Modern period (pre-1500 C.E.), the key agents of Globalization were three-fold: political and military empires, world religions and the migratory movements of nomadic groups, the steppe peoples and of farming societies. In this context Globalization was seen as inter-regional and inter-civilizational encounters.

In the Early Modern period (1500-1800 C.E.), there were several agents of Globalization. What had been called the rise of the West, in other words the historical process which produced the emergence and development of the key institutions of European modernity, the acquisition of technologies and power resources that had exceeded those available to any other civilization and the subsequent creation of European global empires, were regarded the key agents of Globalization.

The Modern period (circa 1850-1945), witnessed an enormous acceleration in the spread and entrenchment of global networks and flows that had begun in the Early Modern Period. Exploiting these innovations, the reach of western global empires and thus of western economic power and cultural influence exploded.

This era saw very extensive, intensive and socially significant patterns of Globalization.

In the Contemporary period (from 1950 onwards) Globalization was shaped profoundly by the structural consequences of the second world war and the emergence of a world-wide system of nation states, overlaid by multi-lateral, regional and global systems of regulation and governance. This era also experienced extraordinary innovations in the infrastructures of transport and communication and an unparalleled density of institutions of global governance and regulation. This era not only quantitatively surpassed earlier periods, but had also displayed qualitative differences (Held, 1999: 414-430).

Towards a Definition of Globalization

Globalization was best described as complex connectivity, i.e. the rapidly developing inter-connectedness and inter-dependencies that characterized modern social life. Giddens defined Globalization as 'the intensification of worldwide social relations which links distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa' (Giddens, 1990: 64). This was a dialectical process because local happenings could move in an obverse direction, i.e. from the very distanced relations that shaped them. McGrew also spoke of Globalization as 'simply the intensification of global inter-connectedness' and stressed the multiplicity of linkages it implied – goods, capital, social-institutional relationships, technological developments, ideas, all readily flowed across territorial boundaries (see Tomlinson, 1999: 2). Dwelling on the complexity of the Globalization process, Robertson observed that globalization increasingly imposed constraints but it also differentially empowered. He defined Globalization as a concept that referred, 'both to the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole' (Robertson, 1998: 8). We look in greater detail at Robertson's definition of Globalization.

The first part of the definition, i.e. global compression, included arguments of theories of dependency and of world-systems. Compression led to proximity which could be seen in terms of the shrinking of distances through the dramatic reduction in time taken either physically (in

travel) or representationally (through information technology) to cross distances. It also referred to spatial proximity via the idea of 'stretching' social relations across distances; the transformation of spatial experiences into temporal existence leading to simultaneous and instantaneous experiences. Global proximity resulted from a 'shrinking world' or in McLuhan's terms, the world was reduced to a 'global village'. The United Nations preferred the term 'Global Neighbourhood'. Phenomenologically, proximity was being described as a common conscious appearance of the world as more intimate and more compressed. Metaphorically it implied an increasing immediacy and consequentiality thereby reducing real distanced relations (Tomlinson, 1999: 3). Global compression that led to proximity also referred to an increasing level of interdependence between national systems by way of trade, military alliance, domination and cultural imperialism. While Wallerstein (1974) maintained that the globe had been undergoing social compression since the beginning of the sixteenth century, Robertson argued that its history was much longer (Waters, 1995: 41). Hoogvelt asserted that world compression was not a new idea. What made it a novelty in Robertson's work was that he argued that world compression intensified 'global consciousness' (Hoogvelt, 1997: 117).

The second component of the definition was more important, i.e. the idea of an intensification of global consciousness, which was a relatively new phenomenon. This implied that individual phenomenologies would be addressed to the entire world rather than to local or national sectors of it. Not only in matters of mass media and consumer preferences, but in all issues – military-political issues, economic issues, religious issues, issues of citizenship, environment, position of women and so on. For the first time in history, the globe was becoming a single social and cultural setting. Thus in all spheres of life, issues could no longer be looked at independently from a local perspective. Globalization had connected the world. Local was raised to the horizon of a 'single world'. There was both an increasing interaction and a simultaneity of frames of reference. Robertson clarified that this did not imply greater integration but greater unification or systematization, where similar institutions and processes emerged say in

banking, political governance or national expressions (national flag, museums, libraries); in other words, there was more connectivity. Nor did Robertson imply more harmony; he was careful to state that while it was a single system, it was divided by conflict and there was no universal agreement on what shape the single system should take in the future. In fact conflicts could be more intractable than the previous disputes between nations. Neither did global unity imply a simplistic uniformity like a world culture. It did not imply wholeness and inclusiveness that was total and encompassing. Rather, it was a complex social and phenomenological condition in which different aspects of human life were brought into articulation with one another. It could lead to cultural differences becoming more accentuated precisely as it was identified in relation to the 'world as a whole'. In its peculiar twentieth century manifestation of a holistic consciousness, Globalization involved the relativization of individual and national reference points to general and supranational ones. It involved cultural, social and phenomenological linkages between the individual self, national society, international system of societies and humanity in general (Waters, 1995: 42).

Globalization – A Sociological Understanding

There was a requirement to understand and analyze Globalization multi-dimensionally in terms of the simultaneous and complexly related processes in the realms of economy, polity, culture, technology and so forth. Sociologists have been at the forefront in the effort to give Globalization a consistent and rigorous theoretical status (Hoogvelt, 1997: 116). Curiously Globalization, or a concept very much like it, had appeared early in the development of the social sciences. Saint-Simon noticed that industrialization was inducing commonalities of practices across the disparate cultures of Europe. Durkheim's legacy to Globalization was his theories of differentiation and culture. The state and the collective consciousness had progressively become more weak and abstract in order to encompass intra-society diversity. All this implied that industrialization tended to weaken collective commitments and to open the way for dismantling the boundaries between societies.

Just as Durkheim identified differentiation, Weber identified rationalization as the globalizing solvent. Weber's concern with the success of rationalization and with its spread from the seed-bed origins of Calvinistic Protestantism to infect all Western cultures implied a homogenization of cultures as well as reduced commitment to such values as patriotism and duty. But even this globalizing effect was restricted to Western Europe. Weber saw no prospect of the spread of rationalized cultural preferences to say India or China that he regarded as inevitably mired in religious traditionalism.

Of all the classical theorists, the one most explicitly committed to a Globalizing theory of modernization was Karl Marx. Globalization caused an enormous increase in the power of the capitalist class because it opened up new markets for it. The establishment of a 'world market' for modern industry gave a cosmopolitan character not only to production but also to consumption (Waters, 1995: 5-6; Robertson, 1998: 15-18).

In the contemporary period the development of the term 'Globalization' as a specifically sociological concept owed by far the greatest debt to Roland Robertson of the University of Pittsburgh (Waters, 1995: 38). Robertson stressed that Globalization needed to be understood as involving contradictions, resistances and countervailing forces, as involving a dialectic of opposed principles and tendencies – local and global, particular and universal, integration and differentiation (Tomlinson, 1999: 16). According to Waters, Robertson's chief rival for the mantle of parent of the concept was Anthony Giddens (Waters, 1995: 47). In the contemporary sociological theory, one of the theoretical debates of Globalization surrounded when it began. Two broad patterns were suggested. I. The emergence of a New Age. II. Through the powerful mediating category of Modernity (Waters, 1995: 4).

I. *The Emergence of a New Age.* Martin Albrow (1997: 6) accepted Globalization on its own terms and in its own time. He spoke of 'The Global Age' that he argued had replaced 'The Modern Age'. The Modern Age had been supplanted and superceded by a new Global Age, with its own axial principles and specific cultural imaginary. The 'epochal shift' from pre-modern to modern to global lay in the axial principles that put communication, mobility and connectivity at the center of human lives (see

Tomlinson, 1999: 38-48).

II. *Through the Mediating Category of Modernity*. Under this pattern, three possibilities could be specified:

i) *Globalization was Seen in the Historical context of Modernity*. Robertson was a strong proponent of this view. Only within the historical appearance of key modern institutions of capitalism, industrialism and urbanism, a developed nation-state system, mass communication and so on, could the complex network of social relations characteristic of Globalization arise. Thus Modernity, understood as the nexus of these institutions, was the essential historical context of Globalization. Prior to this period the socio-institutional conditions and the resources of cultural imagination enabling connectivity were simply not in place. Robertson did not subscribe to Giddens' (1990) view that modernity had led directly to Globalization (or Globality). Rather, Robertson insisted that Globalization of the contemporary type was set in motion long before modernity; in the economic sphere it predated even the rise of capitalism. He did not however deny that certain aspects of modernity had greatly amplified Globalization i.e. Modernization tended to accelerate the Globalization process (Hoogvelt, 1997: 116; Robertson, 1998: 170).

ii) *Globalization was seen as a Consequence of Modernity*. Giddens first (1981, 1985) addressed the issue of the emergence of a global system in a general critique of Marxist theory in which he challenged the view that the development of the capitalist system alone determined the modern history of human societies. Giddens asserted that the development of the nation-states and their capacity to wage war on each other also determined the modern history of human societies. For Giddens, as also for Robertson, the ascendancy of the nation state, which had become a universal political unit, was simultaneous with the development of Globalization. Each was impossible without the other. The world was seen as a network of national societies in a global system of international relations (see Waters, 1995: 47). Later, in his book 'The Consequences of Modernity' (1990), Giddens offered one of the most sophisticated analyses of Modernization and its inherently globalizing properties. Giddens' approach to Globalization was historically discontinuous in

contrast to Robertson's approach that was historically continuous. Using the concepts of time-space distanciation, disembedding and reflexivity, he explained how complex relationships developed between local activities and interaction took place across distances. He saw Globalization as the result of the inherently expansive characteristics of Modernity and listed four such institutional characteristics or 'organizational clusters'. a. A Capitalist system of commodity production (owners of private capital and labour). b. Industrialization (technology required a collective process of production). c. Administrative competence of the nation-state (a good surveillance system). d. Military order (for centralization of control within an industrialized society). He explained that his discussion of Globalization focused on modernity since he saw Globalization as a consequence of Modernity. Modernity implied universalizing tendencies that made possible global networks of relationships and more basically extended temporal-spatial distance of social relationships (Waters, 1995: 48-50). Giddens was critical of the undue reliance that sociologists placed on the idea of 'society' where this meant a bounded system. He was of the view that this should be replaced by starting points that concentrated on analyzing how social life was ordered across time and space (Giddens, 1990: 64).

iii) *Globalization was the result of the hegemony of Modernity*. Wallerstein saw Globalization in its strategic role of the maintenance of western cultural dominance and its universalizing and hegemonic tendencies. The concept of Globalization, he opined, was an obvious object for ideological suspicion, because like modernization, a predecessor and related concept, it was bound up intrinsically with the pattern of capitalist development as it had ramified through political and cultural arenas. It did not imply that every culture/society had to become westernized and capitalist, but it implied that they had to establish their position in relation to the capitalist West. Wallerstein concentrated on the emergence and evolution of the modern European world system, which he traced from its late medieval origins of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries to the present day. Capitalism functioned in relation to the long-term cyclical rhythms, the central one of which

was the regular pattern of expansion and contraction of the whole economy, which over the years 'have transformed the capitalist world economy from a system located primarily in Europe to one that covers the entire globe' (see Waters, 1995: 23-26; Hoogvelt, 1997: 65-67).

II

GLOBALIZATION AND RELIGION

With this brief introduction to Globalization in the context of modernity, we now look at the response of religion to the Globalization process. How had the process of globalization effected religion? And how had religion responded? A global focus on religion had emerged because of a cluster of issues: i), the debate about whether societies were becoming more or less secularized, ii), the resurgence of religion (or the diffusion of religion as a category) and iii), the emergence in the 1970s and the 1980s of church-state and religion-politics conflations and tensions, commonly referred to as 'fundamentalisms', across much of the globe. But first we look at the role of religion in the emergence of Globalization (Robertson, 1998: 2).

Role of Religion in the Globalization Process

Robertson who had been credited with first analyzing Globalization from a sociological perspective, had a dominant interest in trying to isolate the period during which contemporary Globalization reached a point when it was so well established that a particular pattern or form prevailed. According to Robertson, the expansion of the world religions of Islam and Christianity had an important role in this process.

The expansion of Islam took place with the expansion of the Arab and the Ottoman Empires from the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries. By the eighteenth century it had achieved a presence in diverse regions. Christianity had to wait for the military and colonial expansion of Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to acquire a global presence. Prior to this period the globalizing consequence was the incorporation of tribal peasants into large-scale political systems. These two universalistic religions of Christianity and Islam, both derivatives of the Abrahamic faith, became universalizing religions and most effective

globalizers because of their claims that the world was created by a single God and that humanity was a common force of existence in relation to that God. It led to the argument that humanity constituted a single community that disvalued geographical localities and political territories, that there was a single value-reference for every person in the world and that this God proposed a single set of legal and moral laws.

By the sixteenth century, a newer and far more important globalizing religious force had emerged – Protestantism. Catholicism had blurred the relationship between State and Church so that a series of conflicts emerged between Kings and Popes. The Reformation resolved the dispute between State and Church by either subordinating the Church to the State (as in England), or by secularizing the State (as in U.S.A. and France). The State could now rely for its legitimization on the political process of nationalism rather than on religious legitimations. The power of the State thus grew and was itself a pre-requisite for globalization (Waters, 1995: 127-128), (as was seen earlier in the views expressed by both Giddens and Robertson that the development of the nation-state was a requirement for the development of globalization. One was impossible without the other).

Religion in the Modern Period

In the modern period, since the 1960s, many sociologists had put forward the notion that religion in the contemporary Western world had become increasingly privatized. Most prominently T.Parsons (1966: 134), P.Berger (1973: 133f), T.Luckmann (1967: 103) and R.Bellah (1970: 43) interpreted secularization in the modern world to mean that traditional religion was now primarily the concern of the individual and had therefore lost much of its 'public' relevance. Privatization referred to the limitation of the relevance of religion to the private sphere of the individual's life, where in some cases the common universe of meaning was limited or fragmented only to the level of the nuclear family. This implied that the 'religious preference' could be as easily rejected as it was adopted (Berger, 1973: 137). Institutional differentiation (which Luhmann called functionally differentiated societal subsystems) and pluralistic individual identities

were basic features of modern societies. Secularization was the consequence of the relative independence of these initial sub-systems of society from religious norms, values and justifications, i.e. religion now had a limited legitimizing role in a highly differentiated society; it suffered the fate of compartmentalization (Beyer, 1999: 373-374).

What did this imply for religion in general? For an answer, Beyer looked to Niklas Luhmann's (1982) thesis that he opined allowed a clear examination of the problems and potential of religion in contemporary global society. The Luhmannian thesis held that the globalization of society, while structurally favouring privatization of religion, also provided fertile ground for the renewed public influence of religion i.e. religion not only retreated from important aspects of local life, it also developed an institutionally specialized sub-system of its own. By public influence he meant that one or more religions could become the source of collective commitment; collective action in the name of specific religious norms now became legitimate (Beyer, 1999: 373).

In the Luhmannian scheme, the rise of the expert in modern society reflected a socio-structural situation in which professionals became the prime public representatives of societal sub-systems. Thus public importance of a system rose and fell with the public influence of its professional. The question that followed was under what circumstances would individual persons listen to religious leaders, to a new revelation or to a revival of the old beliefs? Religion needed to provide a service that not only supported and enhanced the religious faith of its adherents, but also by which it could impose itself by having far-reaching implications outside the strictly religious realm. It was in this context that contemporary religious movements were of particular interest (Beyer, 1999: 377-78). These religious movements are considered under the title 'Fundamentalist Movements'.

Fundamentalist Movements

The contemporary religious movements that were challenging the secularization thesis could be observed in what was broadly and generally being called Fundamentalist Movements.

Fundamentalism, as John Hawley explained, was an embattled term. It first arose in the United States in about 1920s as a term of self-reference adopted by a group of Protestant Christians who rallied behind a series of pamphlets called 'The Fundamentals' (1910-1915). These writings deplored the evils of modernism – especially scientific rationalism, an 'uncritical' use of higher criticism of the Bible and perceived lapses in moral values. They favoured returning to 'the fundamentals' of Christian belief and practice, eternal pillars of an idealized past. In time the liberal Christians and modernists of a more secular hue began to use the term 'fundamentalist' in a rather broader sense, to designate groups they saw as naïve enough to believe that they could reverse the course of history in favour of a mythic, dogmatically and socially homogenous Christian past. (These positions were articulated by conservative Christian groups, mainly evangelical Protestants) (Hawley, 1999: 3).

The Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 put the term 'fundamentalism' into wide use for the first time. It now referred to religious groups who took political action to reject Western secular modernism in its various forms (Hawley, 1999: 3). As Robertson explained, the term 'fundamentalism' was hardly used outside the United States of America till as recently as the late 1970s and then only on a limited scale. Only in the wake of the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 did there arise the tendency to speak of a globe-wide Fundamentalism. Eventually this term was adopted by people and movements across the globe and came to represent atavism and a narrow rigid mentality. Some of the indigenous movements around the globe adopted and accepted some of the diagnosis that Fundamentalisms were fueled by basically religious and spiritual orientations (see Robertson, 1998: 169).

Today the term Fundamentalism was being applied to two different categories of religious movements: i), to the emergence of what were termed New Religious Movements that were revitalizing old religions and ii), to a wave of what were called Religious Nationalist movements expressing themselves as religio-political movements that were explicit attempts to create a public influence for religion. We look at each of these recent developments separately.

I. *The New Religious Movements*

Social theorists observed that by the 1960s, contrary to the earlier secularization approach, religion was not receding unilaterally from man's life. However religion was not the same any more either (Hadden, 1997: 356). A new religious consciousness was resurfacing that was not simply a reassertion of traditional religiosity, instead there was a search for a 'new consciousness'; a search for new meanings that had a profound religious quality to it (Giri, 1998: 41). As Wilson explained, the New Religious Movements were the response of contemporary man to the contemporary social conditions, just as traditional religion had been the response of man to the social conditions of that time. The ideology of equality and democracy, the emphasis on youth, the new relativism in man's thinking, the search for renewal of self, were all characteristic of the New Religious Movements, or the new religious consciousness that was emerging (Wilson, 1982: 121-130).

The term New Religious Movements, explained Beckford, was first applied by social scientists to refer to a bewildering variety of spiritual enthusiasms that had emerged in the West after the 1960s (Beckford, 1987: 391). However it was today being used chronologically to refer to all religions that had established themselves in Western Europe, North America, India and Japan since 1945 and in Africa since 1890s (Clarke, 1988: 907). The term today had served as a somewhat arbitrary but generally useful term, an umbrella for a stunning diversity of phenomena ranging from cults, sects, spiritual groups or alternate belief systems to doctrinal deviations within world religions and major churches, to passing fads and spiritual enthusiasms of a questionable religious kind (Barker, 1987: 405). The term had also included a spiritual renewal of self and millennial groups (Giri, 1998: 25).

Some of the new religious movements in India included ISKON or International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Rajneeshism, Transcendental Meditation, Sai Baba Movement. Japan had an estimated two hundred indigenous or non-indigenous new religious movements. The more popular were Soka Gakkai or Value Creation Society, Tenrikyo or Heavenly Wisdom and Risshokoseikai. Africa had some twenty

thousand movements, some with only twenty members, others with several thousand. Some of the larger ones were Godianism, Deima and Aladura. In America, the new religious movements were largely known as 'Jesus' Movements or Pentecostal Movements (Wilson, 1982; Clarke, 1988).

Our contemporary society was thus experiencing both a crises in religion and its global resurgence. This resurgence was taking place in all varieties of social systems – from the technologically most advanced to the traditional societies. This retreat from secularization and the revival of religion was taking place, according to social scientists, largely because science, technology and rationality were failing to give meaning in both the personal and occupational lives of individuals and had failed to resolve some of the institutional problems of modern society. It had also failed to provide a guide to man's quest for ultimate concern, accepting that man was by anthropological nature a religious animal. Individuals were realizing the infinite fragmentation that modern developments had caused in their lives and were striving to put these fragments back together again into a meaningful whole (Wilson, 1966, 1982, 1988; Beckford, 1986; Dawson, 1998; Giri, 1998).

II. *Religious Nationalist Movements*

In the 1990s, scholars sensitive to the problem of the emergence of religious groups who took political action leading even to national revolutions, had suggested a series of alternate terms to designate these conservative, neo-traditionalist and often militant religious groups. One such term favoured by writers such as Peter van der Veer and Mark Juergensmeyer was 'religious nationalism'. Juergensmeyer explained that when a religious perspective was fused with a political and social destiny of a nation, it was referred to as religious nationalism. Religious nationalists were not just religious fanatics. For the most part they were political activists who were seriously attempting to reformulate the 'modern' language of politics in order to provide a new basis for the nation state. They were concerned not so much about the political structure of the nation state as about the political ideology underlying it (Juergensmeyer, 1994: xiii; D'Souza, 2000: 29). Nikkie Keddie who

questioned whether nationalism was always the main focus of such efforts had proposed the term 'new religious politics' (see Hawley, 1999: 3).

Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby, in a famous Chicago study titled 'Fundamentalisms Observed' (1991), had elaborately developed the characteristics of Fundamentalism, (which we are here terming 'Religious Nationalism'¹). They explained Fundamentalism as a reaction against the invasive, intrusive and threatening features of modernity by the emerging nation-states of the non-western world. For example, Islamic Fundamentalism represented a delayed reaction to the hegemony of European colonial rule after they became an independent nation state. Religious identity was used as a protective shield against the onslaught of Globalization, which was marked by the entry of integrated 'market systems' which came along with a variety of commodities, values, beliefs and styles of being. The fear of extinction and the threat to survival both as a people and as a culture and the loss of distinctiveness in the rise to homogeneity resulted in the introduction of a comprehensive social system based upon religious principles that embraced law, policy, society, economy and culture. Thus Fundamentalism tended to be totalitarian in its practice and encompassed all areas of private and public life. Religion was declared not just a faith but also a way of life. Fundamentalism of this nature was not religious in the classical sense of the term, but was a variant of a secular faith couched in religious language.

Religious and nationalist movements, it was further observed, often invoked authenticity and 'authentic culture' as a weapon against what was foreign and alien. However this authenticity was questionable, as it became difficult to prove what was authentic and what was not. The invoking of certain traditions and the denying of others required a reconstruction of history, if not its destruction. Historians took pains to demonstrate that historically intercultural exchange, trade and conquest had rendered any notion of authenticity highly problematic. Fundamentalist movements then relied a great deal on invented traditions (Marty and Appleby, 1991: 814-837).

However, Fundamentalism was not a total rejection of the modern. Rather, it had been seen to draw selectively on both tradition and

modernity and to employ every available method of modern science and technology to further its own ends of establishing a distinct identity. Tradition was invoked in areas of dress, treatment of women, family systems. In an edited book titled, 'Religious Fundamentalism and the Human Rights of Women', (1999), Hawley wrote that until recently it was insufficiently appreciated that issues of gender played a crucial role in the language of Fundamentalism. 'What is being championed is a divinely sanctioned vision of natural differences between the sexes that make it appropriate for women to live within boundaries and to live under men's protection, even surveillance' (Hawley, 1999: 3). Modernity was invoked in the form of modern technology and scientific developments, information technology, modern weaponry, arms, computers, Internet and mass public education. Fundamentalism itself had been supported by foreign capital while professing and propagating indigenization (a contradiction). Marty and Appleby observed that in its strategies and methods, fundamentalism displayed a closer affinity to modernism than to traditionalism. Thus while Fundamentalism resented or envied the powers and influence of modernity, it shrewdly exploited its processes and instrumentalities. It had sometimes used democratic processes to come to power (Marty and Appleby, 1991: 827). Lechner (1990a: 95) contended that where the discontents of modernity were felt more keenly and defined more sharply, new and stronger Fundamentalist movements were likely to emerge (see Robertson, 1998: 170).

Fundamentalism was driven by the affinity-identity passions of ethnic communities and religious groups often thirsting for self-esteem and dignity. Fundamentalism as seen above was an effort to 'neutralize the other' and establish one's own identity. In other words, the question of 'cultural survival' was at the core of the issue of religious revivalism. This process could be observed in the East European countries that belonged to divergent cultural communities and ethnic groups after the demise of the Soviet Union. Their demand for economic autonomy and preservation of cultural identities resulted in the ethnic conflicts between majority Muslim and Christian minority Serbs in Bosnia, between minority Christian Serbs and majority Muslims of Albanian origin in the Kosovo province of

Yugoslavia. This process can also be observed in parts of Indonesia today. In India religious-cultural and ethnic clashes are being experienced in the efforts of those of the Hindutva ideology, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) or 'Sangh Parivar', to create a communal divide between the Hindu majority and the Muslim and Christian minority communities in India.

In his initial understanding about the relationship of Globalization to Fundamentalism (seen more generally as the search for fundamentals), Robertson saw Fundamentalism as an attempt to express the identity of a society, a felt necessity to declare a social identity. This aspect saw Fundamentalism as a reaction to Globalization resulting from the compression of an inter-societal system. Fundamentalism was about differentiations and distinctions between the self and other (Robertson, 1998: 175).

In his recent attempts to grasp analytically the more general problem of Fundamentalism, Robertson saw Fundamentalism more as an aspect of or a creation of Globalization rather than a reaction to it. It was an assertion of a deep particularity, i.e. a global construction and dissemination of ideas concerning the value of particularism, a declaration of a particular identity. He saw it in the context of the apparent paradox of globality-locality. The idea of Fundamentalism as a reaction or resistance to Globalization was not discarded, it was only built into the general process of Globalization. He preferred to see Fundamentalism as a 'search for fundamentals' in the context of the compression of the world, which was a more respectful acknowledgement of peoples' real practices rather than the term 'extremism'. Fundamentalism thus constituted ways of finding a place within the world as a whole, ways that frequently involved attempts to enhance the power of the groups concerned. It was not necessarily anti-global. It actually involved a quest for community, for stable values and beliefs and was an assertion of power. Robertson explained it in terms of a two-fold process – particularization of the universal and the universalization of the particular. This idea of the right to identity, 'the struggle for recognition' as Fukuyama (1992) described it, was widespread. Fundamentalism then was a product of globality, and even though it took ostensibly anti-global forms, it tended to partake

of the distinctive features of globality (Robertson, 1998: 175-178).

CONCLUSION

In conclusion we observe that the term Fundamentalism was being applied to two categories of religious movements. One, to New Religious Movements and spiritual enthusiasms that were seeking a 'return to fundamentals' or were a new religious response to social conditions of contemporary society. And two, to Religious Nationalisms that were more political expressions by religious leaders seeking a political identity for a religious culture. As Beyer explained it, religion in the world seemed to be going on in both conservative and liberal directions, i.e. concentrating on ministering to private religious choices and entering the political and public arena (Beyer, 1999: 393). Lawrence explained it was today better to speak of global fundamentalisms rather than a single world-wide fundamentalist movement and to acknowledge the agenda of each as being discrete in its local setting (Lawrence, 1999: 98).

Looking at the future role of religion in society we observe that religion and politics had been separated in a post-Enlightenment period of the secular west, which may not have been viewed in this manner in a pre-Enlightenment period of western culture (King, 1999: 7-14). (In India such a separation may not have existed at all as held by T.N.Madan, 1983). Socio-cultural gaps of our uneven modern world would continue to evoke varied responses from both religious and secular ideologies. The first step in coping with Fundamentalisms was to appreciate the fundamentalist dilemma. The symbolic and emotive power of Fundamentalism was as authentically modern as it was persistently disruptive (Lawrence, 1999: 99). Understanding the present role of religion in a globalized society may then require a shift from the Enlightenment period paradigm, without a reductionist approach in either direction – religion, politics or culture.

NOTES

1. For the subsection subtitled 'Religious Nationalist Movements', the term 'Fundamentalism' refers to 'Religious Nationalism' as described by Juergensmeyer.

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