Sociological and Pedagogical Reflections on the Chances of Human Beings Under the Qualitatively Structural Changes of the World System

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CHAPTER 15

I

In the following essay, the chances of human beings shall be analysed under the present existence conditions by a social scientific perspective. A scientific analysis requires the development of a theoretical frame of reference, through which structural changes of present society can be identified and requirements for institutional regulations of resulting new problems can be derived.

First of all, a definition of the present societal situation has to be given. From 1989 on, not only a historical period seems to have come to an end, but also many theories of the past are not used anymore. In the uncertainty of characterising the new situation structurally, it can be seen that it concerns a phase displacement or a change “of” the system instead of one of the usual changes “in” the system. “A new world is taking shape in this end of millennium. It originated in the historical coincidence, around the late 1960’s and mid-1970’s, of three independent processes: the information technology revolution; the economic crisis of both capitalism and statism, and their subsequent restructuring; and the blooming of cultural social movements, such as libertarianism, human rights, feminism, and environmentalism. The interaction between these processes, and the reactions they triggered, brought into being a new economy, the information/global economy; and a new culture, the culture of real virtuality. The logic embedded in this economy, this society, and this culture underlies social action and institutions throughout an interdependent world” (Castells, 1998: 356).

In a “speculative consideration” of the role of sociology and societal integration Rene König (1979: 359) writes: It seems that “in view of the uncertainty of the definition of the status quo, the admission is important that we simply do not know (and from a viewpoint of sociological knowledge cannot know) where we stand yet. Since sociology receives its impulses from a specific constitution of society, this condition has to shape itself first before it can be articulated. Even now, the phrase that the owl of Minerva flies only at sunset, is still up to date and valid. To write the history of the future an awareness and consciousness of epochal change is prerequisite. We will certainly have to be patient for some time to come” (König, 1979: 359). Most likely, enduring considerations will be necessary to find out where sociological theory stands today. Not only partial theories have to be revised, but above all, the complex connection between theories. Even though the outcome of this revision will only be visible after its conclusion, we will try to attempt an outlook in the following.

If the structure of sociology as a science system is the equivalence of a predominant social structure of a historical constellation, then sociology must, of course, change with social change in the sense of an epochal change (that does not mean change “in” the system but rather change “of” the system). Urry (2000: 1) even tries in his book on Sociology beyond Societies “to develop a new agenda for sociology and sets out to make a manifesto for its reformulation in its ‘post-societal’ phase”. Likewise Touraine (cit. Urry: 17) argues “that the framework of classical sociology is collapsing because society itself is decomposing”.

In spite of these questions, there seems to be, in connection to Rene König, another problem that is of great importance. One which refers directly to the relationship of sociology and the general process of consciousness of society. The question simply is, if whether this relationship has stayed immovably the same, or if it maybe did change under the pressure of the changing social structure. The old relationship of sociology to the societal consciousness of its time was one of an “alarm function”, resp. a “signal function” for an oncoming or already occurring crisis which could not be resolved with the conventional political, economical, and intellectual means. Sociology, in this sense, was then known as a “crisis science”. Since that time, sociology works like a kind of seismograph in the con-
Sciiousness of society, which measures existing, or yet to occur upsets of society and its sub-systems. Through this not only the awareness/consciousness is awakened but also simultaneously the search for repellents activated. In the service of the coming police state, reaction circles of sociology even wanted to vindicate the character of an “early warning system” to be able to counter inner disturbances in time.

After the attempt was made to reduce the meaning of sociology to a short formula with the term “applied enlightenment” (Dahrendorf) or “sociological enlightenment” (Luhmann), a new accent entered the discussion. “Enlightenment” firstly refers to societal consciousness in the sense of “enlargement”. But enlightenment also in the sense of Kant means “emancipation of man from his self caused mental immaturity”, which raises the opinion that the function of sociology compared to societal consciousness is not only cognitive - distanciated but also participative. Therefore showing a practical component in which an ethical note is included. König has proposed to call this component as “integrative”, which raises the next question: what exactly is to be integrated?

From this question, König hopes to derive a new aspect that may let the function of sociology appear in a new light. One thing is certain: No longer can the establishment of an existing condition be meant with integration because that would not be integration but rather the fixation of the status quo. Actually it is just the opposite, a looking at the future, anticipative, “creative” integration. This coincides with the theory from Humboldt to Heydorn, mentioned later on, insisting on the resistance human subjects show towards social relations and their search for transcendence of those social relations.

Enlargement of consciousness in the mentioned theoretical-practical double sense can perhaps be called a process of identification or self-finding, which surely has integrative importance. “Consciousness is everything”, is Heydorn’s conclusion at the end of his article on survival. This conclusion rests on the notion that thought processes which demythologize society – supported and encouraged by its rational structure – are both necessary and possible, and on the insights that humans can only become subjects by mentally penetrating their material conditions, through their capacity (for action), and then transforming them.

Above that, another perspective can be looked at in the sense of why this process of consciousness enlargement has to be encouraged through special events and does not enact itself. Can there possibly be structural characteristics of a given society which question or hinder the possibility of finding its identity in such a way that a helpful hand from “outside” (therefore extrinsic) is necessary? At this point the reflection comes upon the decisive structural characteristic of modern society, that is its unique and up till now unknown character of complexity. Even relatively small societies show such a complexity combined with interwoven elements internally and externally, that no observer, however experienced, can achieve a synoptical view of it. This difficulty is heightened by the fact that we have to observe ourselves in order to learn about the main and typical structures of modern society. This in turn, can only be done with the help of those societal methods of perception that we want to observe. Therefore it doesn’t surprise that in the social sciences there is no theory that all would share-simply because we cannot take on an objective viewpoint from outside of society. 1

II

Despite these reservations, several things can be said about society. Not in the form of objective truths but as a justified suggestion on the view of societal relations. The following statements are to be understood in this sense. Now what are the main structures of modern society? (cf. to the following Türk, 1997 and 1998)

When a line up is ventured, three structural elements are predominant that have to be looked at. All three elements are unique in world history: at first they develop only in the western world and, something which is also unique, they spread across almost the entire world. This on the one hand, causes the societal world to become monotonous in its structures, and on the other hand, causes the development towards a single world society to progress further towards a world society whose structures are becoming more similar but at the same time are bringing forth growing and sharp contrasts and differences in the chances of life and prosperity. Which are the structural elements?

1. At the beginning of the 19th century it was already observed that a new type of structure was starting to develop out of a combination of two processes: dissociation of communality and specialisation. In the first process an increasing number of functions of local and municipal life and work communities are being
outsourced: primarily politics, law, economy, science and education are being dissociated from communality and increasingly regulated through overlapping mechanisms. At the same time, in the second process, these areas are becoming more independent, own spheres with their own logic dominated by new experts and elite, so called “functional elite”. Heydorn interprets this as the “transition from the educated to the experts” and, “from the educated bourgeoisie to functional elite”.

Everyone of these spheres now develops its own views of the world and dynamics of growth, which the communal ways of life just have to obey. This process which sociologists today call “functional differentiation” has been progressing up to the present date in the sense that it has encompassed the entire world. So today we have a world-political, world-economical, world-scientific and increasingly, a world-legal system.

Special about this new form of differentiation is, that in principle with each prevailing perspective of a subsystem, the entire world can be made to a topic: for instance, everything can be looked at and treated under the perspective of money, as can be seen in the example of education. This turning of education into a tradable commodity has brought with it the development of a “World Education Market”. This event was first held in Vancouver, Canada, in May 2000 as a place to bring together the international buyers and sellers of education service. “The organisers intend to hold the World Education Market on an annual basis. They anticipate that it will grow as education is increasingly traded as a part of a global commodity market. And, of course, the World Bank has a presence at the event promoting the sale of education” (cf. Larry Kuehn, 2000).

2. Closely connected to the first is the second structural element: The capitalistic mode of production. This mode of production can only fully develop when the economy can free itself, with the help of the process of functional differentiation, of the restraints of religion, moral and education, national regulations and restrictions through laws. In regard to functional differentiation there is a dissociation of communality. The development of the capitalistic principle with its orientation of endless accumulation and way of seeing as many things as possible as goods, like the establishment of the World Education Market, stands for a process of dispersal of self-economy in the hands of the communitie. This capitalistic way of production, which was already globally intended since the end of the middle-ages, has led up to today to one single capitalistic world system. “In a historical world perspective, modern capitalism is a unique phenomenon: No other formation of society is known, that has, to this extent, achieved an almost complete submission of nearly all people on the globe to its principles of structure. If not in person, most people are then formally submitted to the mechanisms of ‘economic structure’ of capitalism. This submission is promoted through a universal ideology which expresses itself in the hegemonic descriptions of institutions” (Türk, 1997: 161).

3. The third, main structural element is that of organisation. Especially since the beginning of the 19th century this way of regulation through power has dominated an increasing number of human corporations. The number of organisations today is not countable anymore. On an international level alone, there are 40,000 registered international organisations. Modern society, for Schimank (1997), is an organisation-society in the sense, that generally all areas of life are affected by organisations and that these have progressed almost everywhere to decisive producers of achievement and decision makers. Organisations are taking over the part of the old corporations and associations. Its specific feature, among other things, lies in the aspect that they can concentrate on specific, very restricted purposes, that they are assigned purely instrumental structures, and that they create a very own category of persons, the so called “legal persons”. These characteristics, among others, contribute to the fact that action and consequences of action can be attributed to these organisations. This has two consequences: Firstly, organisations can make profit and accumulate it to capital. Secondly, personnel and members of organisations undergo a relieve of responsibility because it can be said that something was done not as a human being but rather as a holder of an office or as personnel. A specialisation also takes place here, only a particular view of things and events. “The purpose-oriented rationality is thus institutionalised and therefore a highly problematic principle of orientation of human action while at the same time relieving the individual from consequences of action. Only through this is the building up of long claims of actions with long-distance effects possible which we find today” (Türk 1998: 6).
All three principles of structure – functional differentiation, capitalist way of production and organisation – have to do with a specialisation which has enabled the building up of the great complexity of the modern world, through the apparent paradox that so many things do not have to be taken into account. So the complexity arises out of simplification. Everyone of these structural complexes of modern society has this in common, above that, an individual societal “function”. Because of this, everyone of these characteristics of structure has its own problems, which in combination up. “All three principles increase the complexity of modern society to a great extent, but all three are ‘dumb’ principles, even though...most people, and most scientists will claim otherwise” (Türk, 1998: 9). All three principles have the dumbness of an extremely limited problem awareness capacity. One which can only see itself. “The common feature of the dumbness of these three complexes of structure is the abstraction from concrete persons, their needs, problems, and social relations. In other words: These complexes of structure create, up to the point unknown, a complexity of the social world, but this is a complexity of the institutional complexes themselves, not the complexity of human existence. The complexes of structure cannot capture, regulate, or control their self-created complexity out of exactly the same reason with which they create this complexity: Because of their abstract selectivity and particularity. Every intervention of political, economical, and technical nature thus creates a gigantic surplus of consequences. All great problems of the present day are brought about by these structures. Not only technologies create risks, but also societal structures and principles” (Türk, 1998: 10).

Globalisation firstly means the interruption or disturbance of feedbacks. This means that only the smallest part of consequences of action falls back on the actors themselves. The structural specialisation, which we talked about above, have their main momentum in such disturbances of feedbacks. Secondly, globalisation means, and this is only seemingly a contradiction to the just said, an increase of the strict coupling between individual societies and the people of the globe. The increase of the strict coupling altogether means an enormous increase of the fault-susceptibility of the world system through the development of rigid, unbuffered connections between different units. “It is about a process of increasing globally strict-coupling of material life, therefore about the development of an unintelligent complete system” (Türk, 1997: 163), which contradicts the law of fault-affability. The third new quality of globalisation lies in a world historically unique homogenisation of societal institutions. Nearly all countries of the world have taken up the essential institutions of the western world. This institutional similarity is economically and politically necessary and enforced if one wants to participate in the world system at all, i.e. every one is forced to take part. “This homogenisation also is, from a viewpoint of evolutions-theory, extremely unintelligent” (Türk, 1998: 12). Finally globalisation means asymmetrisation, and again this is not a contradiction to the just said parts on homogenisation, an up till now hardly known social differentiation in three dimensions: a) There is a national and global process of progressing differentiation between the rich and the poor, b) In connection to that, we have a severe process of differentiation in the claims of natural resources, c) we can find another new type of process of downgrading: a process of increased exclusion of increasingly greater parts of the world population from the system of paid labour. At the same time an equal type of actual prevention of the return to substantial communal self-economies takes place. “Everyone is included in the institutional arrangement of the modern world system but at the same time, very many people are excluded from considerable participation in the sub-systems of economy, etc. The social sciences today analyse this phenomenon under the terms of ‘inclusion’ and ‘exclusion’, whereas one can speak of an ‘excluding inclusion’. The number of existences on the borderline are increasing through this. This also is a result of the mentioned processes of strict cou-
planning and of institutional homogenisation. There are hardly any forms of existence outside of the system which is institutionally enforced” (Türk 1998: 14).

IV

Where in earlier times there was a sort of “collective consciousness” which allowed it to grasp society as an unity in spite of strongest inner differentiation, and this in a cognitive as well as experimental sense, today this is becoming more and more impossible and, under the structural conditions of “globalisation as domination” (Schäfer, 2000), this is becoming obsolete. Even the national consciousness (see König, 1979: 364), which in the 19th century was virulent, is not able to start up any integration anymore. The international and multinational power of economical mammoth organisations, which are the key agents of globalisation whose frame of action is defined through international organisations like IWF, World Bank, WTO (see Aseem Prakash / Hart, 2000), has sentenced the national consciousness to the state of being an illusion. Out of this arises the image of over-differentiation and complication which we started out with.

With this, a whole new function of sociological theory has become visible, which Rene König has labelled the “integration function”. As the most important achievement of the “Handbook of empirical social research”, König depicts the disclosure of this extensive social change which works at the turn of the 19th to the 20th century and was completed around the 1960’s (König 1979a). “Because the complexity of the developed industrial societies, after establishing themselves, has reached a quality until now unimaginated, integration isn’t possible not only on ethnical, but also on a social, economical and national-institutional level”, as König writes in his comment to the findings of his already mentioned Handbook. Integration can, so to speak, only be enacted “in the mind”. Since in view of the qualitative structural changes of the world system, the symbolic integration does not suffice anymore, highly complex political myths like globalisation and the free market economy are taken on instead. “In the fight for the undivided power of what is called the market, that is money, the ‘theory of globalisation’ is the central symbolic weapon. This ‘theory’ is an extremely effective legend and is important because it surrounds itself with the air of reason. It is predestined to justify the destruction of state (or at least to question some of its functions) through politics which want to remove all barriers of the free game of national and international financial powers” (Bourdieu, 1997: 13).

To explain the social effectiveness of this “religion of the market and of productivity”, the reference to the interests of those who profit from the social order does not suffice. It has to be seen, that it is, like every religion, a “well-founded illusion”, whose basis is to be found in reality (cum fundamento in re). Here we want to point to Castells (1996), in regard to several facts and trends, which the prophets of globalization can call upon. “Our exploration of emergent social structures across domains of human activity and experience leads to an overarching conclusion: as a historical trend, dominant functions and processes in the information age are increasingly organized around networks. Networks constitute the new social morphology of our societies, and the diffusion of networking logic substantially modifies the operation and outcomes in processes of production, experience, power, and culture. While the networking form of social organization has existed in other times and spaces, the new information technology paradigm provides the material basis for its pervasive expansion throughout the entire social structure. Furthermore, I would argue that this networking logic induces a social determination of a higher level than that of the specific social interests expressed through the networks: the power of flows takes precedence over the dynamics of each network vis-à-vis others are critical sources of domination and change in our society: a society that, therefore, we may properly call the network society, characterized by the preeminence of social morphology over social action” (Castells, 1996: 469).

Even though the cleavages which König had in mind in 1979 are, in view of those described by “The Rise of the Network Society” (Castells, 1996), rather idyllic, we choose to take on König’s idea. At this point in our reflection, sociology could take on the “whole new function” which König pointed out, by the fact that as a critical sociology, these highly complex thematic coherences could be made transparent and a cognitive penetration of the structural characteristics of the network society could be started. “Integration would then not be achievable anymore on an institutional level but only in the context of a new philosophy which however, is not anymore about “being” and “becoming” but rather about the chances of human beings un-
nder the outlined conditions of existence” (König, 1979: 369).

As can be seen in the following considerations, the structural characteristics of the chances of human beings, which can be derived from sociological analysis and summed up in the words of Castells: „Our societies are increasingly structured around a bipolar opposition between the Net and the Self” (Castells, 1996: 3), can be depicted in the pedagogical reflections concerning the relationship between pedagogy and politics, understanding the political process itself as a process of universal education (see Sünker, 1994).

Reflections on the relationship(s) between pedagogy and politics require mediations between social theory/philosophy, social politics and educational theory - in the interest of both showing the distinctions and the interwovenness of these areas.

When Hegel, one of the most decisive and influential theorists of modernity, wrote - in the chapter 'The Spirit Alienated from Itself. Bildung' of his 'Phenomenology of Spirit' - that the language of disunity is ‘the perfected language and the true existing Spirit of this entire world of Bildung’ (Hegel, 1952: 370) and added that ‘power and wealth are the ultimate ends of its efforts, it (self-consciousness, H.S.) knows that through renunciation and sacrifice it forms itself into a universality through which it achieves general recognition; power and wealth are the real acknowledged powers’ (Hegel, 1980: 286), he was referring to the social mediations which determine particular conditions in the field of education (Bildung). Hegel’s analysis also demonstrates his interest in the restoration of a destroyed reason which he approaches in terms of the development of the education or acculturation of the human spirit.

This Hegelian introduction connects very well with what Heydorn saw as the relationship between pedagogy and politics:

The engagement with the political and rising industrial reality is at the same time (at the beginning of bourgeois society, H.S.) many-sided, radically antithetic, dialectically mediated, and sees the task of education (Bildung) as a comprehensive attempt to give people the capacity to deal with distance and find a solution to their imprisonment/adhesion. Education (Bildung) is always placed in the process as something with its own quality, forced upon people and carrying the past along only as the future (Heydorn, 1980b: 53).

Heydorn’s call to revitalize the idea of education (Bildung) and to give it a new interpretation in the light of changed social conditions, to decipher and to reestablish the relationship between education (Bildung) and politics, is related to Klafki’s concern that:

General Education (Allgemeinbildung) must, especially today, oppose the recent trend towards depoliticisation, and must also be understood as the active embodiment of an evercontinuing process of democratisation (Klafki, 1986: 475).

Klafki was here referring back to the early classical bourgeois theorists of education (Bildung), such as Humboldt, Hegel and Schleiermacher and their very conscious attempts to encourage reflection on the mediation between social relationships and educational endeavours, a reflection on the relations of tension between educational theory (Bildungstheorie) and politics.

The subsequent decline of educational thought (Bildungsdenken) and productive efforts in educational theory (Bildungstheorie), which can be explained in social and political terms, has been analysed in an exemplary way by Adorno in his 1959 masterpiece on the ‘Theory of Half-Education’ (Halbbildung), in which he identifies the relationship between social history and educational theory (Bildungstheorie):

What education (Bildung) has turned into, sedimented as a sort of negative objective spirit, and not only in Germany, was itself derived from social laws of movement, even from the concept of education (Bildung) itself. It has become socialised half-education, the ever-presence of the alienated spirit (Adorno, 1972: 93).

Adorno’s analysis ends with the statement of a practical task, which he ended with the following well-known words:

If in the meantime the spirit only does what is socially correct, as long as it does not dissolve into society in an undifferentiated identity, anarchism is upon us: clutching to education (Bildung) after society has destroyed its foundations. But it has no other means of survival than critical reflection on half-education, which becomes essential for it (Adorno, 1972: 121).

These arguments by Heydorn, Klafki and Adorno, devoted to the relationships between
pedagogy and politics, the idea of education and social development, can serve as the background to an examination of the causes and consequences of the current renaissance in educational theory (in the shape of Bildungstheorie), which coincides with a renaissance in the concept of the subject.

It is important to remember the diverse contexts which led, in the debates in the Federal Republic of Germany, to the substitution of the concept of education (Bildung) with the categories 'learning', 'socialisation' and 'qualification'. The degeneration of the concept of education (Bildung) into an empty formula (Nipkow, 1977), the social scientific turn in educational science, which formerly was called and known as ‘Pedagogy’, debates on the relation between systems of education and employment, which were referred to as the sociology or political economy of education, are all interrelated (cf Sünker, 1984: 2 - 20).

Heydorn, the most inspiring educational theorist this century in Germany, has interpreted this development as the consequences of a process of the ‘degeneration of neohumanism into dandyism’, as the ‘transition from the educated to the experts’ (Heydorn 1979: 171), and ‘from the educated bourgeoisie (Bildungsbürgertum) to functional elites’ (Heydorn, 1979: 297). In his work on ‘survival’ he also criticises the economism of the dominant left theories of education, which are hostile to culture and often reduce the question of the form and content of education/Bildung in all times and places to problems of ‘derivation’ in the context of a political economy of the education and the training.

After the degeneration of the concept of education (Bildung), which was essentially expressed in terms of bourgeois functionalism, led into its abandonment, findings have emerged in the meantime concerning the internal limitations and the functionalism of the new approaches and categories, so that the question of the effectiveness of a theory of Bildung for a critical science of education and social theory has been on the agenda for a number of years.

The concept of qualification, in particular, calls up, so to speak, the perspective of the Capital, since the attribution of value constitutes the estimation of significance; issues concerning the educational process are, in the context of socialisation research, reduced to questions of the socialisation process only (Mollenhauer, 1979: 241).

My reference to the concept of education (Bildung) will maintain, develop and extend the social-critical impetus which was built into the constitution of the concept of Bildung in its early bourgeois form, with which the ‘Project of Humanity, the idea of Humanity’, was to be resolved in a non-subjective and non-objective way (Sünker, 1989a).

VI

Heydorn did not only examine the general theme of ‘the interdependence of constitution of society and educational institutions’ (Heydorn, 1980a: 99), but also the distribution of these relationships in the particularities of educational and social history; that is, he analysed the relevant constellations, relational forms and practises. He thus developed specific categories required for his analysis, which focus on a mäeutic concept of education (Bildung) as ‘unbound self-autonomy’ (Heydorn, 1979: 10). In this way he hopes - following Humboldt’s example - to make clear that although institutional education is bound up in the determining effects of interdependence and is thus historically objectified, it is not to be interpreted in objectivist terms. The particularity and falseness of determination remains significant, because the possibility of breaking through it arises from social praxis (Heydorn, 1980a: 99).

Heydorn’s reconstruction of educational and social history demonstrates the distinction between the human capacities for cognition and action anchored in the educational processes of species-history, and the real-historical, always deficiently developed emancipatory development of society.

This is the primary reference point of his work on ‘survival’, which approaches from a number of perspectives the question of the standard of education a society must possess in order ‘to enter the coming millennium with a prospect of survival’ (Heydorn, 1980: 288). For Heydorn this leads to the promising thesis that, in the connection between education and survival, the consciousness of ones own requirements becomes the starting point and the first process in a dynamic of liberation (Heydorn, 1980: 293). Heydorn’s hope can be read parallel to Lefebvre’s reflection on theories of cognition and action, which sets out from the premise that active knowing unfolds itself in images, images of a changing life: ‘At the same time this cognition must undergo a praxis of transformation. The act which inaugurates cognition
with praxis, is poietic: it creates simultaneously concepts and images, perception and dream' (Lefebvre, 1975: 122-123).

What requires clarification is the extent to which the growing significance of institutionalised education is related to the growing acquisition of a human content (1980: 287), to give the buried content of the concept of education (Bildung) a renewed contemporary character (1980: 291) and to identify the outline or contours of a concept of education which advances the present (1980: 293).

If one reads the historical development to the present as determined by human fate or imposition (Heydorn, 1979: 31) - alternatives to human agency, the question of the freedom-burying potential of human development becomes the most decisive contemporary problem. Because a further 'bare survival' correlates with increasing human self-destruction' (Heydorn 1980: 187-188) - which he calls collective neurosis - the first task becomes explaining how we can acquire anew a productive consciousness which is directed at the fulfillment of the future’ (1980: 283) and thus a life of quality.

When the question of survival is posed not simply in terms of preventing war or social criteria limited to material conditions, the problem becomes what a future of ‘quality’ in a fundamental and comprehensive sense actually requires. Related to an emphatic concept of humanity, human subjectivity and to a concept of utopia inherited from Comenius as ‘memory of an obscure world’ Heydorn writes: ‘The universal species, which releases the wealth of its potential, is the ultimate utopia of education (Bildung)’ (1980: 298).

VII

Heydorn emphasises - and this shows his embedding in the tradition of Western Marxism (cf. Sünker, 1989a) - that history possesses no certainty, contains no automatic future, and has no laws ‘which operate independently of human being to bring them its end’ (Heydorn, 1980: 301), but especially today appears on the agenda to bear the ‘heavy burden’ of the ‘freedom of becoming’ (1980: 301). Humans must therefore be recognised as actors and thus the subjects of their own history (1980: 284-285). This generates the task of precisely disentangling the condition of the linkage of educational and social history, and to establish the humane perspective on human maturity and self-determination.

In the context of such an analysis of real historical and social relations, which include political practices and the various forms of institutionalised education, and which with reference to realpolitik (and Heydorn mentions Prag and Santiago in this context) also examines the current balance of power and its differential consequences, it is worth discussing the realisation of the idea of education (Bildung).

The analysis must include a reconstruction of the possibilities of development of the original attempt at a concept of education as a discourse among people about their own freedom (Heydorn, 1979: 32) out of their evolving social-historical conditions. The dialectic of the institutionalisation of education leads to the poles of liberation and domination, which correspond to the class aspects of education, and the connection between them has to be related to the figurations (Gestalten) of homo faber and homo ludens (Heydorn, 1980: 285). The conceptual universality and simultaneous empirical restrictions of education which arose with the bourgeois world (1980: 285) radicalised the disintegration of the concept of education (Bildung) produced by the mass education required by the industrial revolution; this radicalisation can in turn be understood in terms of class history. In this way the transformation of education as ‘cultivation’ into education as ‘training’ was ‘compelled by the necessity to treat also the dependent masses as empirical bourgeois subjects’ (Koneffke, 1982: 946).

At the same time it must be remembered that the origin of education in Greek antiquity indicates that there were two dimensions inherent in it from its beginnings: on the one hand a social orientation which corresponds to the task of knowledge production, aiming simply at partial human talents, but on the other a quality contained within education itself which leads to the overthrow of these social relations. The interpretations of Antiquity and the Enlightenment and the forms of engagement with nature they contained, indicate how an emancipatory character unfolds in this engagement (Heydorn, 1979: 12-13; 1980: 290). Hegel’s discussion of the dialectic of the master-slave relationship (1952: 141-142) first indicated the ways in which freedom can be won from domination and determination (Sünker, 1989: 103-110).

The fact that education can become universal and comprehensive stimulates an organised process of education for an ever increasing number of people (Heydorn, 1980: 287). Although
within empirical limits the relationship between practical instruction and the simultaneous subjectification of people becomes disrupted (1980: 289), the social structure is still decisive for that development: the extent of its rational structure and the abstract character of production are still somehow woven together, so that ‘the comprehensive character which education has achieved in the light of the state of technical development’ corresponds to a comprehensive paralysis and elimination of is revolutionary potential, i.e. the potential to enlighten people and turn them into self-determining actors (1980: 290). The contradictory constitution and reality of society does not exclude education; at the same time the process which is subject to this development has the following effects: ‘The general character which education has acquired, indicates that the moments of education (Bildung) overcome their class-historical disintegration, and can become universal in a liberated species (1980: 291).

Heydorn does not see education as a self-sufficient revolutionary element in history, that is as serving above all the cultural and social development of people, and that it can only be this in connection with the whole of historical development (1980a: 100). However, one can insist that educational institutions offer ‘their own transformative contribution, which cannot be substituted for any other’ (1980a: 167) for the realisation of this emancipatory perspective. What requires further discussion is how an examination of the dialogical structure of educational processes and educational relationships, focusing on the concept of mutual recognition and mæeutics (Sünker, 1989: 147ff) contributes to educational theory (Bildungstheorie).

VIII

Heydorn relates education to the ongoing processes of appropriation which overtake new social realities. Decisive here is his assessment that the appropriation of human identity encroaches upon the appropriation of the production process (1980: 295; cf. Bowles and Gintis, 1987). This perspective is tied to the conception of a ‘revolutionisation of work’ and a ‘revolutionisation of free and disposable time’ which can be thought of as a process ‘through which humans become subjects. Both processes must operate simultaneously, as the expression of changing needs’ (op cit; cf. Marx n.d.: 230-231; 387, 431-432, 505, 587-97; Heller, 1976).

In this context the formation and cultivation of consciousness gains a historically unique significance (1980: 294). Heydorn’s conclusion at the end of the article on survival, ‘Consciousness is everything’ (1980: 301), rests on the notion that thought processes which demystologise society - supported and encouraged by its rational structure - (1980: 300) are both necessary and possible, and on the insight that humans only become subjects by mentally penetrating their material conditions, through their capacity (for action), and then transforming them (1980: 294). This is not mere speculation in the negative sense, but indicates the progressiveness of Heydorn’s arguments and ideas, as is shown by Pierre Bourdieu’s similarly constructed argument (in his Logic of Practise), formulated in social scientific terms:

This miscognition, unaware that it produces what it recognizes, does not want to know that what makes the most intrinsic charm of its object, its charisma, is merely the product of the countless crediting operations through which agents attribute to the object the powers to which they submit. The specific efficacy of subversive action consists in the power to bring to consciousness, and so modify, the categories of thought which help to orient individual and collective practices and in particular the categories through which distributions are perceived and appreciated (Bourdieu, 1990: 141).

For Heydorn intellectuals (and analogously teachers) play a decisive role in the history of consciousness, for as products of bourgeois society, they are simultaneously produced by that society as a corrective for itself, a ‘negation behind its back’ (1980: 291). The task for intellectuals, if they do not become pure cynics, has since the time of Socrates and his mæeutic been the art of questioning, questioning ‘the whereabouts of human beings’ and with his determination and resoluteness to ‘tolerate no abandonment of this questioning’ (1980: 299).

IX

In his major work on the contradiction between education and domination Heydorn examined, inter alia, the development of neo-humanism, particularly in Humboldt’s writings on theory, politics and society. His analysis demonstrates the breadth and depth of Humboldt’s commitment to equality and individuality, which indicates the reflexive progressiveness of early bourgeois theory, even though it did not make
apparent the state of either society or individual existence (cf. Vorges 1979: 68, 77).

This theory - from Humboldt to Heydorn - insists on the resistance human subjects show towards social relations and their search for transcendence of those social relations. In the most recent social scientific versions of educational theory, which have taken on the form of a Theory and Sociology of Education, this idea is formulated and discussed in terms of reproduction, social inequality and resistance (cf. Young and Whitty, 1978; Apple, 1979, 1982; Misgeld, 1985; Rang 1988; Giroux and McLaren 1989; Wexler, 1990; 1992; Farnen, 1993; Kolbe et al., 1993). In Humboldt’s case his critique of utilitarianism, the orientation of people towards utility and what is given and established, is based on the notion of a mediating relationship between freedom, self-determination, autonomy and versatility (Rang, 1984). It shows great insight into the consequences of the development of capitalist society. Humboldt’s solution to the problem of survival is to accept a constitutive division between education and politics, in order to separate education from social reality so that ‘an ever-threatened human haven can be rescued’ (Heydorn, 1979: 117).

For the future too it is important to retain an emancipatory distinction between social circumstances and individual conditions, although for Heydorn the potential for a totality of subjectification has improved, so that the question of the relationship between education and politics can be posed anew, because education no longer underlies politics, to evade the most severe contradiction, but the political process itself can be understood as a process of universal education (Bildung).

Mass liberation, which will be ultimately realised with the universality of the species as an educational task, as the epitome of self-determination, can only be realised through a long chain of independent actions. The experience of happiness which they contain and manifest is irretrievable (1980: 297).

Heydorn’s cautious optimism about the possibilities for the future is based on the hope that ‘with this experience (of self-determination and happiness, H.S.) we are already set free, even while we are still subordinated’ (1980: 298).

There are good grounds, I believe, to argue that precisely the development and experiences of civil rights movements in Eastern Europe and the former GDR, as well as old and new social movements in the West, support this optimism.

In the interest of emancipatory human development, a realisation of a mature potential for reason, a particular alternative must be posed to ‘the decline of the individual’ - hence the mediation of pedagogy and politics (Heydorn, 1980: 286, 1980a: 102; Horkheimer, 1974: 128-161). Expressed in terms of social criticism with a focus on educational theory (Bildungstheorie), this involves a fundamental rejection of argumentation by the logic of subsuming which sacrifices the particular to the abstract general (the leitmotif of Adorno’s ‘Negative Dialectic’ (1966) too). For Heydorn education (Bildung) then serves ‘the defence of the individual person as humanity’; ‘Education intends the comprehensive empirical realization of humanity as a genus whose possibility it experiences in its other’ (Heydorn, 1979: 25).11

This is why considerations of what is general in General Pedagogy (Allgemeinbildung) are such important themes in the disentanglement of the constitution of subjectivity. At the same time this shows that reflections on the relations between educational theory and political culture (cf. Sünker 1993), between mäeutik and democracy12 are central issues; for democracy and mäeutic share - as Lefebvre has put it - a common interest: the ‘valorization of subjectivity’ (Lefebvre 1978: 7) so that, in Heydorn’s words, the education (Bildung) of all, emancipation and self-determination become the goals of human education (Bildung).

NOTES

1. The difficulty increases with the fact that two opposing paradigms, the Eurocentric and the planetary characterise the question of modernity. The first, from Eurocentric horizon, formulates the phenomena of modernity as exclusively European, developing in the Middle Ages and later on diffusing itself throughout the entire world. Weber situates the “problem of universal history” with the question: “to what combination of circumstances should the fact be attributed that in western civilization, and in western civilization only, cultural phenomena have appeared which (as we like to think) lie in a line of development having universal significance and value” (Weber, quoted by Dussel, 1998, p. 3). According to this paradigm, Europe had exceptional internal characteristics that allowed it to supersede, through its rationality, all other cultures. The second paradigm, from a planetary horizon, conceptualizes modernity as the culture of the centre of the first world-system, through the incorporation of Amerindia, and as a result of the management, of this “centrality”. “In other words, European modernity is not an independent, autopoetic self-referential system, but instead is part of a world-system: in fact, its centre. Modernity, then, is plan-
3. Compare Heydorn’s observation with a consideration from Habermas:

"I maintain only (e.g. with regard to tribal societies) that individuals can develop structures of consciousness which lie on a higher level than those which are already embodied in the institutions of their society. It is primarily subjects who learn while societies on the whole can only figuratively speak make evolutionary steps in learning. New forms of social integration and new productive forces owe their existence to the institutionalization and use of forms of knowledge first acquired by individuals but capable of being harnessed and meditated on in a collective manner.“ (Habermas, 1985: 234)

4. Regarding to time diagnosis I want to refer to two ideas:

a) "À l’horizon de la modernité se levi un astre étrange: après la production des choses, c’est la production des êtres humains eux-mêmes qui passe au stade industriel" (Bertaux, 1992: 35);

b) "The social techniques and the forms of human socialization that determine the appearance of the ruling culture have largely forfeited their function as order factors in the current phase of historical development. The process of organizing the social techniques of the ruling structure is beginning to invert into a disorganizing process in which it is precisely the factors that previously served to maintain order that become factors of disorder and destruction. Vice versa, it becomes clear that the unfolding of the free ability to communicate in the broadest sense of the word, which was previously ‘underdeveloped’ through habitual unconscious repression, has become the hardly recognized cultural goal of the present generation, and it is possible that the chance for humanity to survive in the near future depends on its widescale realization." (Kilian, 1971: 273-274)

5. The starting point of Lefebvre’s analysis is grounded on the recognition of the necessity of a mediation between theories of education and a critical social theory in the shape of a theory of everyday life (cf Sünké, 1992). This leads to arguing for the praxis of a sort of mäeutic ‘in assisting the birth of everyday life’s potential plenitude’ (Lefebvre, 1971: 18). The original Text expresses the ambiguity of everyday life in a lucid manner: ‘aider la quotidienneté à enfanter une plénitude présente-absente en elle’ (Lefebvre, 1968: 39).

6. This illustrates the usual way of arguing against the restrictions of reproduction approaches in the theory and sociology of education: ‘Reproduction theorists have overemphasized the idea of domination in their analyses and have failed to provide any major insights into how teachers, students, and other human agents come together within specific historical and social contexts in order to both make and reproduce the conditions of their existence.’ And: ‘Whereas reproduction theorists focus almost exclusively on power and how the dominant culture ensures the consent and defeat of subordinate classes and groups, theories of resistance restore a degree of agency and innovation to the cultures of these groups.’ (Giroux, 1983: 259-260; cf. 282)

Agency is a key-term used to discuss the anti-structural determinants and the overcoming of class relations. It went along too with the rediscovery and the reinstatement of the actor in general social sciences (cf. Connell, 1983; Touraine, 1983).

7. These considerations of Heydorn are closely related to ongoing debates in the sociology of work. As Lévi-Strauss and Braverman’s ‘Labor and Monopoly Capital’ (cf. Thompson, 1983). Complementary to this Anglosaxon debate one
can read the contributions within a German discussion on the development of the labor process focused on the term ‘new concepts of production’ and the emergence of ‘intelligence of production’ (Kern/Schumann, 1985). One major subject of both debates - and that is of great interest in the field of educational theory (Bildung) – is the analysis of the nature of work and its attendant social relations today. The results of this debate are very contradictory: The main point is linked with the assessment of the outcomes of the rationalisation process in firms in its consequences for the wage labor. Is it (only) a substitution of Taylorism and its techniques of control by modernized techniques of control or does the development, i.e. real changes in the labor process itself, show a real increase in the action and design space for the workers?

Bowles and Gintis have shown the mediation between economy and education: ‘Economic necessity is today one of the most binding constraints on educational choices over the course of one’s life: a guarantee of an acceptable livelihood would open up a more ample array of educational choices by eliminating the threat of personal economic calamity as a possible consequence of a wrong choice. More obviously, the democratization of the economy would itself constitute a major step toward accountability and liberty in a major learning environment. . . . Our commitment to democracy is both to a means and to an end, although in both cases the commitment is an admittedly minimal and insufficient basis for a fully articulated philosophy of education. Our commitment to the social movements (cf. the different considerations drawn from Simon (1972) and Aronowitz (1992)).

8. Using his own analysis as a background, Heydorn wrote: ‘The new revolutionary subject, the only theme of our concern, is a knowing subject.’ (Heydorn, 1979: 224) Knowledge is the starting point in the battle against domination, since in bourgeois society knowledge rests on objective connections, on abstract references, on the priority of the abstract over the concrete - as Adorno put it: ‘The pre-philosophic consciousness lies on this side of the alternative; for the subject who acts naively and sets himself against the environment, his own conditionedness cannot be seen through. In order to overcome this, the consciousness must make it transparent.’ (Adorno, 1966: 217, cf. 294-297, 335)

Regarding ‘Knowledge’ an alternative approach to ideology critique is presented by Drucker, (1993).

9. This optimism is challenged by the real shape of some old social movements (cf. the different considerations drawn from Simon (1972) and Aronowitz (1992)).

10. Compare the recent discussion of society, community and individuality and individualism that is titled ‘Communitarians against Liberals’: ‘The debate between contemporary liberals and their communitarian critics has raised our understanding of the philosophical foundations of liberalism to new heights of theoretical sophistication. But, in my view, neither the theories nor the debate between the theorists has significantly advanced political understanding or the cause of social justice. The “community” favored by the communitarians is just as troublesome as liberal “justice”. Perhaps “justice as fairness” is flawed for supporting a theory of the unencumbered self, but its communitarian critics are at least equally at fault for providing theories of disembodied politics.’ (Wallach, 1987: 582; cf. Benhabib, 1989; D’Amico, 1990a/91; Piccone, 1991)

11. This dialogical perspective on the constitution of the subject must be tested within the framework of the previously mentioned subsuming logic: Heydorn’s observation connects with Lippe’s analysis as follows. Within the framework of his study ‘The domination of nature in humanity’ he proceeds on the assumption that the end of an epoch has been reached during which one could think that the advance of the species could only and especially be driven forward through the rivalry of individuals, i.e. through their autonomous education in mutual isolation. Hence the species must deliberately and socially appropriate its advance in actual individuals. They constitute the subject of history in reality, no longer merely in name and without active awareness of the fact’. (Lippe, 1974: 60)

Another approach is shown by Lefebvre. He discusses the contrasts between destructive developmental possibilities of society and alternatives developing from a praxis which takes up the contradiction between the alienated forms and the social form of ‘alterity’, and which focuses on their consequences for social existence: ‘As “alterity” or responsiveness to others is realized, alienation declines and disappears.’ (Lefebvre 1975: 69)

12. Heydorn distinguishes ‘Erziehung’ (upbringing) and ‘Bildung’ (forming): Education aims at affirmation, social control (Zucht in German), Bildung aims at emancipation, maturity, self-determination, subjectivity based on intersubjective relations. What I call ‘Bildung’ can be connected very strongly with the use of the term ‘Learning’ by Giroux and McLaren, especially with respect to the mediation between education and democracy. They refer to “the debate over education as part of a wider struggle for democracy itself”, to an “educational discourse that connects the purpose and practice of schooling to a public philosophy in which learning is seen as a part of a wider discourse of freedom and democratic struggle”. (Giroux/McLaren, 1989: XXII, XVIII; cf. Held, 1987; Sünker, 1992a; Miedema, 1993).


ABSTRACT This article analyzes the present chances of human beings under a double perspective: On the one hand with regard to the relationship between sociology and the general process of consciousness/awareness of society. An analytical frame of reference is drafted which focuses mainly on two questions: what are the main structures of modern complex society and what kind of structural change occurs in the world-system? On the other hand the focus is upon the reflections on the relationship between pedagogy and politics - in the interest of showing the distinction and the intertwoveness of these areas, understanding the political process of universal education under the structural conditions of the world-system.

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