INTRODUCTION

The state as a political organism is erected on the bedrock of efficacious structural political organisation. Thus, structural political organisation is one of the indispensable determinants of administrative efficiency of any given state. And, all over the world, there exists various types of this structural political arrangement though, with varying degrees of relevance and utility.

One of such organisations which has withered the test of time in most democratic Polities of the world is federalism. It is a common thing to now accord federalism the characteristics of polity building hence, Schmitt (1997:19) once opined that “the benefits of statehood-liberty and autonomy-are gained through... federal (political) arrangement. Thus reincarnating Laski’s (1948) position that “liberty in a state cannot be preserved without a measure of federalism” embedded in its political process.

The political utility of federalism as a polity-building mechanism and an enhancer of people’s liberty is deep-seatedly rooted in history. Since its adoption as a political organisation, it has continued to gain vitality by ways of practical utilisation in different countries all over the world. This trend has been articulated by Schmit (Ibid:20) thus:

Federal political arrangement reached their apotheosis in the form of three first modern federations such as the United states under its 1787 constitution, Switzerland under its 1848 (and then 1874) constitution and Canada under its 1867 constitution. Indeed, during the modern epoch it was only federation which offered a model of statehood able to serve as an alternative to the reified state.

On the same token, Ajayi (1997:149) synoptically reincarnated the earlier documentation of this trend by Eleazar (1973). According to this trend, federalism was practically operated in seventeen countries in 1971 while eighteen other countries adopted federal principles to augment the decentralization of their system of government.

In his own appraisal and empirical documentation of this trend, Schmit (op.cit:24), claimed that, “nearly 40 percent of the world’s population currently lives within political systems which are formally federal”. To him, federalism is “among the most widespread of the various revolutions which are changing the face of the globe” (ibid)

The reasons for this widespread embracement of federalism as a form of political arrangement have been advanced with varying degrees of specificity. The underlying assumption of federalism which provide opportunity for mutual understanding of the terms of cohabitation by the federating units (Wendler, 1997:iv) has been implicitly identified as one of the catalysing factors of the spread of the federal idea. This spread has equally been tied to the fact that:

federalism has emerged as a means of accommodating the growing desire of people to preserve or revive the intimacy of small societies, and the growing necessity for larger combinations to mobilise the utilization of common resource better (Schmitt op.cit: 24).

The popular acceptance and spread of this political arrangement in our view, innocuously necessitate its theoretical and practical analyses. The principal aim of this paper is to analytically consider federalism in the theoretical and practical perspectives with a view to determine its adequacy or otherwise for today’s political realities, particularly in Nigeria.

In pursuing this goal, this paper is divided into five parts. The introduction is the first, while the second part synoptically considers the concept of federalism particularly in line with its definitional pluralism. Against this background, the third part reviews the concept from the theoretical perspectives of scholars who have written many tomes on the concept and, who, by doing so, and, without prejudice to the various contestations on
the subject-matter in question, have eloquently through argumentative premise provided the basic characteristics common to all federalism. The fourth part looks at the adequacy or otherwise of the theoretical perspectives on federalism in view of the contemporary realities or complexities of today’s political systems across the globe giving relevance to the gender dimension of political existence of the citizens. The fifth and final part concludes the paper.

THE CONCEPT OF FEDERALISM

Federalism as a concept of governance connotes a political system or arrangement erected on two (or more) levels of government. And, these levels deal with common and territorially diverse issues and policies (Akindele et al., 1998; Akindele, 1987; Nwabuzor and Muller, 1985; Awa, 1973; Akindele and Olaopa, 1997, 1998). However, the pattern of relationship among these levels of government as does their actions or inactions are rarely stable over a period of time. In other words, federalism is “highly dynamic and the equilibrium of its power is continuously changing” (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1969: 136) in ways conducive to mutually beneficial reinvention for both the “governors” and the “governed” whenever the need arises. Thus, it has been argued that “federalism is a process rather than a static design” (Ibid). And, that it is a spectrum (Livingstone:1971:25) because it is not:

- absolute but a relative term, there is no specific point at which society ceases to be unified and becomes diversified. All countries fall somewhere in the spectrum which spring from a theoretically wholly integrated society at one extreme to theoretically wholly diversified at the other (ibid)
- There is no doubt that a federal political arrangement is complex and demanding, looking at its various components which Schmitt (1997: op.cit.:150) likened to “a car model” with several different bodies, engines and several types of options.
  This explains why Smiley (1977) once argued that:
  - a federal system must attempt to deal with diversities which are territorially based either by conferring the power over some of these pervasive diversities on the state or by giving the constituent (local government) units a permanent voice - (or function through decentralisation or devolution) - in the central government (to make the citizens feel the impact or presence of the government).

It equally explains the varying degrees of definitional elucidations given to the concept of federalism by most scholars. While Rodee, Christol, Anderson and Greene (1983:52) defined federalism as “a constitutional division of governmental power between the national and the constituent units,” to Friedrich (1963:585) federalism is a union of group united by one or more common objectives but retaining their distinctive group being for other purposes... it unites without destroying themselves that are uniting and it is meant to strengthen them in their group relations. Along this same analytical plane Akindele (1995a:138) once defined a federal state: as a political entity or country where powers and indispensable decisions are exercised and made at two or multilateral levels of government in accordance with the strict mutually agreed constitutional provisions of the country concerned.

It could be reasonably argued that these positions formed the basis of Kolawole’s (1986:1) claim that “federalism is anchored on consentient relationship” and, that of Eleazar (1968:360) that: federalism can exist only where there is considerable tolerance of diversity and willingness to take political action through conciliation even when the power to act unilaterally is available.

These complexities have affected the thinking of various scholars on the concept vis-à-vis their theoretical constructs on it and its applicative subject matter. This explains why Akindele (1995a: 92) once opined that:
- The concept of federalism, because of many tomes already written on it has not been free from the problem of definitional pluralism... In other words... it is not an exception as far as the problems of defini-
tion are concerned.

It equally explains Idahosa and Aghahowa’s (1997:151) claim that, there is no agreement among writers on a single definition of the term “federalism”.

These contestations notwithstanding, the basic characteristics peculiar to all federal political arrangements have been theoretically packaged by scholars of repute within the scholarship of political science and related disciplines. These theoretical exploits are analytically perused in the section that now follows.

The Theory of Federalism

There is no gainsaying the fact that, various contending theories have been propounded by scholars in their attempt to analytically bring into clearer perspectives the nitty-gritty of federalism as a structural mechanism for the governance of men within various polities that form part of the physiology of global political community. These theories have variously highlighted the components inherent in federalism (already referred to above) as does the attention they deserve in that: the actual sorting out of functional tasks among different levels of government is a perennial source of tension and uncertainty in most federalism (ACIR, 1980:301).

It should be stated at this point, that, our consideration of federalism in theoretical and practical perspectives would be more of a contemporary review of the works of Wheare (1964), Riker (1964), Livingstone (1971), Eleazar (1966, 1973), Friedrich (1963) and other scholars of the contemporary period in line with the complex demands on today’s federation. But then, we would argue that there can hardly be any appropriate point of departure than the contributions of K.C Wheare (1964).

Our adoption of Wheare’s work as the point of our analytical take-off is anchored on this scholar’s universal acclamation as the reputed father of (modern) federalism (Akindele, 1995b: op.cit:92). Infact, Wheare’s contribution to federalism which, as recently noted by Ajayi (1997: op.cit: 151) was based “in its entirety on the American 1887 federal model” now forms the bedrock of all federal polities (Akindele 1995b:op.cit:92). His doctrine of federalism, which, while recognising the inevitability of conflicts among the components of the federation or any federation, prescriptively advocates mechanism for constitutionally dealing with such conflicts include the following:

- The division of governmental responsibilities between levels of government.
- A written constitution spelling out this division and from which federal and state authorities derive their powers.
- A judiciary independent of both levels of government that acts as an arbiter in cases where there are conflicts over the jurisdictions enumerated in (1) above.
- The federal arrangement emphasizing co equal supremacy of the various levels each in its respective field of operation.. the citizens of the federation being concurrently under two authorities and owing loyalties to them (Wheare, 1964).

Put together, Wheare views federalism as a form of government which embodies “the federal principles”-(VanLoon & Whittington op.cit: 143). However, the workability of these principles is contingent on the recognition of the dual prerequisites of federalism which according to Wheare (op.cit.:35-36) stated that:

... firstly, the communities of states concerned (i.e., federating) must desire to be under a single independent government for some purposes...secondly, they must desire at the same time to retain or establish independent regional government in some matters at least.

This, among others, explains Smiley’s (1976:2) argument that “the most characteristic aspect of a federal constitution (i.e. federalism) is its division of law-making powers between the central and regional governments”. It equally explains the catalysing factors for federating in most polities which Awa (1973, op cit) called the “determinants of federalism” and, which (Ola, 1992:71) identifies as:

(a) A sense of insecurity and an acknowledgement of a need for common defence
(b) A hope for economic advantage
(c) Some profitable historical association, which is simply continued in this form.
(d) Some feelings of mutual compatibility of the component parts
(e) A history of peaceful co-existence and
settlement of disagreement through a process of give and take.

Viewed against the foregoing, Elaigwu’s (1994) argument or position on what federalism is becomes more understandable. According to Elaigwu (1994:148):

A federal system of government often arises from the desire of a people to form a union without losing their identity.... It is a compromise in a multinational state between two types of self-determination - the determination to maintain a supra-national framework of government which guarantees security for all in the state, nation or the nation-state on the one hand and the self-determination of component groups to retain their individual identities on the other hand.

Thus, expatiating further on the concept of federalism, VanLoon and Whittington (op. cit. 143) eloquently argued, that, “a federal system reconciles a desire for over-all unity with a desire for local or regional autonomy.” And, this argument, has since been reinforced by Ramphal (1979) when he claimed that federalism basically satisfies the need for co-operation and fulfils the desire for unity without being parasitic to local identity and power (emphasis mine)

Even though, these positions sound confirmatory vis-à-vis one of the core arguments of Wheare, the latter’s position, apart from its being unrealistic in terms of contemporary federalism, has been variously criticized.

These criticisms have further enlivened our understanding of the concept of federalism particularly in theoretical perspectives and their implications for practical politicking and political actions or inactions of government in today’s political systems. The most prominent of these include those of Livingstone (1971) and Friedrich (1964) which are respectively examined at this point of our analysis.

Livingstone (1971: 2) condemned Wheare’s legalistic definition of federalism on the basis of the fact that, it was too narrow and un-sociological. On the basis of this analytical plane, he sociologically depicted the nature of federalism thus:

The essential nature of federalism is to be sought for not in the shading of legal and constitutional terminology but in the forces of economic, social, political and cultural (systems) that have made the outward forms of federalism necessary... the essence of federalism lies not in the institutional or constitutional structure, but in the society itself... A federal government is merely a device by which the federal qualities of society are articulated and protected (Ibid: 22).

Livingstone went further in his condemnation of this legalistic undercurrent of Wheare’s characterisation of federalism by using territorial demarcation of diversities as a premise for distinguishing the characteristics of federal polities. In the process he claimed that:

The diversities may be distributed among the members of a society in such a fashion that certain attitudes are found in particular territorial areas, or they may be scattered widely throughout the whole of the society. If they are not grouped territorially then the society cannot be said to be federal. But, it is in the former case only this can take the form of federalism or federal government (while) in the latter case it becomes functionalism, pluralism or some form of corporatism (Ibid: 23)

As for Friedrich (1964), federalism is dynamic rather than rigid as postulated by Wheare. While attacking the “federalising process” advanced by Livingstone (1971:op.cit) which, if accepted would make all polities federal or capable of being federal, Friedrich theoretically espoused that:

Federalism is a process rather than a design... Any particular design or pattern of competencies or jurisdictions is merely a phase, a short-run view of a continually evolving political reality. If understood as a process... it will become apparent that federalism may be operating in both the direction of integration and differentiation (ibid: 2-3)

In addition to these criticisms, are those synoptically packaged by Ajayi (1997:op.cit) who claimed that “Wheare’s reliance on jurispru-
dence for the operation of the (federal system... makes his theory (to be) too legalistic, rigid and not to be true all the time for all, or most polities since his “equal and co-ordinate” thesis does not hold in real practice.” In the same vein, though, not with equal potency of condemnation, Riker (1964: 5), improved on Wheare’s classical position on federalism by functionally describing the concept of federalism as a technique of governance. In the process, he identified federalism as the main alternative to empire. And, structurally, he identified federalism as having three characteristics viz:
1. two levels of government rule the same land
2. each level has at least one area of action in which it is autonomous and,
3. there is some guarantee of autonomy of each government in its own sphere (even though a mere statement in the constitution) (ibid: 11)
This position tallies with that of Sawyer (1976) who likened federalism to a situation:
Where geographical distribution of power to govern is desired or has been achieved in a way giving several government units of the system some degree of security, some guarantee of continued existence as organisations and as holders of power.

In his own contribution to the explanatory efforts on this concept, Mossman (1993: 103) has argued that internally, federalism offers an elementary flexibility within a fixed structure in which conflicts can be mediated”. In the same vein, Atkey (1970: 154) claimed that:
Federalism is a political method of distributing governmental functions between a central government and governments of the component units of the federation generally on the basis of a “national” or “local” characterization... It is a positive political value (which needs) to be perfected by the application of sound and imaginative techniques by both or all levels of government.

Put together, argued Logams (1994:168), the theory of federalism and the contestations it has progenized are founded upon the idea that, the existing structure of societal conflicts, consensus and resources can be organised into at least two communities to which citizens belong. It is equally predicated on the idea that federalism is a device for the coexistence of unity and diversity (Lar, 1994: 39).

Up to this point, the concept of federalism and the excitements it has generated have been examined to a significant extent. But then, the realities or complexities of our federal political systems call for practical solutions or actions in ways amenable to the sustenance of their delicacies. In other words, the discussion in this paper up to this point has shown that federalism- as a concept of governance- needs to be perfected through the appropriate institutional mechanisms that recognise the delicacies of its network of relationships which, among others, currently include the struggle for gender equality.

This being the case, the next section of this paper briefly considers the adequacy or otherwise of the theoretical perspectives as herein articulated and what should be done (if need be) for today’s complexities of our federal political systems particularly that of Nigeria.

THE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES: HOW ADEQUATE FOR TODAY’S FEDERAL COMPLEXITIES AND GENDER (EQUITY) STRUGGLE?

There is no gainsaying the fact that as could be deciphered from the arguments in this paper so far, and, other sources which exist everywhere within the academia, that, a lot has been written and said about the complexities of federalism. This notwithstanding, however, there are reasons and need to further perfect this system of government looking at its obvious complexities. The fueling capacity of these complexities for further complexities, imperatively necessitated the sourcing of appropriate mechanisms that could contemporaneously enhance the adequacy and relevance of these theoretical constructs on federalism for the federal polities of today. Akindele (1995b: 96) identifies “a healthy system of intergovernmental relations (IGR) as a perfecting mechanism in a federal political arrangement like Nigeria. This is because, “it treats all levels of government in a federalism as equals” And, as articulated by the ontario economic council (in 1977: 3), this mechanism “allows the greatest freedom of choice particularly at the local level (of federal political arrangement) while avoiding “beggar-my neighbour deci-
sions”. In fact, according to Akindele (1995b: op.cit), IGR is an appropriate antidote to the non-realistic nature of Wheare’s classical theory of federalism vis-a-vis the realities of today’s multiplexities of asymmetrical goals, demands and interests within federating political systems.

The indispensability of a proper intergovernmental relations to the practical augmentational adequacy of the various theoretical constructs on federalism in today’s federal polities are identifiable within the chronology of the reasons once advanced by Dare (1980: 53). These reasons which call for an effective intergovernmental relations in today’s federal polities among others include:

1. The imperfections of the distribution of functions. The very distribution of functions between federal and state governments create loose threads where the powers of one government end those of the others begin. In other words it is virtually impossible to distribute powers without some overlap.

2. Concurrent jurisdiction: Even the federal constitution allocates the same functions to the two or three levels of government. For example housing. When both federal and state governments exercise concurrent powers over the same matter or territory, cooperation is the only alternative to overlapping and useless duplication of efforts and the only way to avoid interference by one government with the activities of the other.

3. National Economic Integration- In most federations despite the lip service paid to the autonomy and financial independence of the component units, the requirements of modern economies call for joint planning. To do this, consultation and cooperation have become mandatory. For this reason almost all federations have set up joint planning agencies.

4. Floods, droughts and large-scale national disasters which affect any part of the federation force concerted emergency actions.

5. Consultation and cooperation help to reduce the adverse effects which actions or inactions of certain states may have on citizens of other states. Example includes the attempt by certain states to raise revenue through special levies on citizens from other states - discriminatory school fees or tax on transients.

6. Most federation today attempt to maintain the same standards in their services. Many federal projects are handled for the centre by the state authorities. These automatically call for federal grants, which are made subject to meeting stated standards-roads, come readily to mind.

7. Professionalism in administration has led to what Deil Wright terms “Picket Fence Federalism”, according to which each functional area of government activity such as mental health, housing and agriculture, like-minded programmes specialists or professionals work together on the basis of shared values, concerns and interests. These officers rise above politics.

Not only this, due to the myopic interpretation of most, if not all, provisions of federal political arrangements within most polities of the world, it has been rightly observed that, federalism as theoretically espoused and practically adopted in a country like Nigeria needs to be reinvented because of its structural defects and pathologies (Asobie, 1997). In fact, without plastering the nation’s wounds, Asobie(ibid) boldly, and, maturely too, using historical approach, identified the real genesis of the “anti-federalism orientation” in Nigeria. This, he called the centralizing trends which, according to him, started since 1954 and continues to encourage the unilateral alteration of the existing distribution of powers among the levels and components of Nigerian federation.

Specifically focusing on Nigeria, it is our view that the myopic philosophy of “water-tight” classical federalism (Akindele, 1995b. op.cit: 99, Akindele and Olaopa, 1998) must be discontinued. Instead, authority of the constituent units, using appropriate and mutually acceptable intergovernmental relations institutions, must be respected. Such authority must not be withdrawn without mutual willingness. For example, the now common unilateral alteration and distortion of the nation’s military command needs re-orientation, restructuring and reorganisation in line with the characteristics of a truly federal system of government. The military must be made to perform its constitutional functions of defending the nation against external and internal aggression when called to do so, instead of its present usur-
pation of the governance of the nation and conscription of the Nigerian masses into the oppressed class part of the fallout of which include the now obvious femocracy rather than the needed feminisation of women in politics.

Eventhough, as we would like to innocuously emphasise here, the link between feminism and federalism is still being forged, as an ongoing thinking, this reorganisation is particularly necessary in that, femocracy which, mama (1995: 41) conceptualized as “an antidemocratic female power structure” has been militarily made part of Nigeria’s political life. It was as a result of this we once had in Nigeria institutions for: Better Life for Rural Women Programme, Family Support Programme, Family Economic Advancement Programme and so on. It is innocuous to argue that these femocratic structures have been practically incapable of advance the cause of the Nigerian Women despite being meant for same by their designers. These failures are traceable to no other thing than the fact that the femocratic structures are mere “political handouts” to the wives of the members of the military oligarchy who have no ideas of their own about how to advance the cause of the ordinary women through committed struggle. This is clearly and factually, put into perspective or corroborated by the treatment of the office of the First Lady by the Presidency in the Fourth Republic. Eventhough, the excuse for such treatment has been largely anchored on the lack of constitutional backing or provision for such an office, we would contend that, if the hitherto creation and existence of the office has been through feminized political struggle rather than through femocracy, it would have been difficult if not totally impossible for the Presidency to act the way it did on the office. Infact, as it existed and still exists in some polities in Africa, the office of the First-Ladies, according to Okeke (1999:38):

gives a group of women, whose credentials for the job rest on their position as wives to men in authority, the responsibility of mobilizing of women, planning and implementing public programmes for them with little or no accountability.... The office of the First Lady is well integrated into the government machinery and therefore cannot bite the finger that feeds it. To the extent that first ladies’ claim to power is tied to their relationship with men in power, their actions can only reinforce the very basis of Nigerian women’s subordinate status.... women in such prominent roles only reinforce rather than confront the existing relations of gender. Their public presence do not significantly change the prospect of either the larger female majority who bear most of the burden of social transformation on the continent, or the few at the fore front of the struggle whose expertise and courage would have made a difference.

This being the case, the military in Nigeria, as it is done in most polities of the world, particularly India, “where its primary focus is to safeguard the nation’s economic interests” (Onuorah, 1999: 19), must be made as it should, to truly exist as the servant of the masses in Nigeria as opposed to its present centralised rulership over the masses. This is particularly germane at this point of democratic governance and continuous struggle for same in Nigeria, in view of the fact that:

The dawn of democracy on May 29, (1999) effectively marked the imperative of the military’s transition into a truly professional and dutiful force..... rather than a force that has operated a libertarian system for decades lording it(self) over (on) the rest of society (Onuorah, 1999: 19). This is particularly necessary among other things, if federalism in Nigeria is to be truly taken as a structural device for the co-existence of unity and diversity which cannot but include the issue of women and the need for their political emancipation among other critical societal interests.

In addition to the foregoing, the nation’s intergovernmental fiscal relationship needs revamping in such a way that the states would not be constantly deprived at will, of their control over their material and economic resources, (Akindele, 1995a, 1956b; Akindele et al., 1997). In other words, the fiscal arrangement must be such that allows or confers on the state the power of self-financial determination that would rescue them from the current situation in which their developmental aspirations or powers of independent financial thinking and existence are tied to
the apron-strings of the federal government’s willingness.

With these done, Nigerians, without gender discrimination regardless of the system of governance, would have unfettered rights to democratically or freely participate in the identification and determination of their political preferences in ways conducive to the attainment of the non-parasitic hope and goals which anteceded their desire for federating. It would equally encourage their continuous willingness to remain federated.

CONCLUSION

We have examined the concept of federalism in its theoretical and practical perspectives in this paper. In the process, we identified the state as a political organism which exists for the betterment of mankind and which needs to be availed in a practical sense, the necessary wherewithal of efficacious existence if the raison-d’être (betterment of mankind) of its existence is to be achieved. And, we equally argued and identified a federal structure of political arrangement as one of the prerequisites for achieving this.

We provided various conceptual elucidations of federalism by different scholars of repute as a prelude to our identification of the theoretical exploits on the concept perse by these scholars. As a follow up to these, we examined the adequacy or otherwise of the classical theories of federalism vis-a-vis the complexities and realities of today’s political systems which among others include the struggle for gender equity in the authoritative allocation of the scarce and critical societal resources and, the ordered determination of the beneficiaries.

In doing so, it was identified that, for most of today’s polities (Nigeria in particular), to be truly federal, as they claim to be, certain changes are needed. For example, in Nigeria, such changes are required in the areas of power sharing, military structure, intergovernmental-fiscal relations, revenue allocations, economic resources to mention a few. These changes in our view should equally include a constitutional feminization of some aspects of the political process to engender the necessary gender balance. This is particularly necessary in view of the fact that: an essential ingredient of democracy is that, it is based on the quality of all the people (without gender or any discrimination), within a nation’s boundary, and that all the laws of the land apply to all adults without exception. The nation’s constitution must provide methods by which the people can, without recourse to violence, control the government which emerges in accordance with it and, even specify the means for its own amendment. In shorthand, the constitution itself, must be based on the principles of Rule of Law (and under these principles, there should be no gender discrimination towards the women as we have in Nigeria: (These emphases are mine) (Nyerere, 1999:2)

With these in mind, we argued for a real and committed re-invention and refocussing irrespective of the enormosity of the accompanying challenges, - of the present Nigerian federalism as the only mechanism for resuscitating it from its present and most obvious structural decadence and defects.


ABSTRACT In this paper we examined the concept of federalism as a political arrangement that has been adopted for the practical realisation of the principles of democracy in Nigeria and other similar polities within the world. More importantly, following a thorough theoretical consideration of the subject-matter of federalism as one of the structural paraphernalia of true democratic practice, we zeroed-in on the inadequacies of the Nigerian federalism as it affects most aspects of the existence of the citizenry today. Apart from suggesting the reversal of its present centralizing tendencies, we identified its lack of recognition of gender equity among its other defects. Consequent upon this, we called for a real restructuring of the Nigerian federalism. In other words, we called for a federal structure that has constitutional provisions for gender balance in ways conducive for a proper feminisation of some aspects of the political process in line with the principles of rule of law which would go a long way to better the lots of the female citizens. This, in our opinion, would put a desired stop to the constant femocracy which, apart from its being an anti-democratic female power structure, has now taken on a near-epileptic nature in Nigeria, looking at the way its now acclaimed institutions or attributable benefits, (e.g the Better Life for Rural Women Pragramme, Family Support programme, Family Economic Advancement Programme etc.) have been intentionally, though, appropriately, terminated in Nigeria with constancy each time the military transfers power to itself or change itself
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