The Urban and Rural Spaces: Consequences of Nature Conservation and the Rural to Urban Migration: A Case of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area, Zimbabwe Sector

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ABSTRACT Over the past two decades, there has been an increase in the number of transboundary conservation initiatives in the Southern Africa region. Among other consequences these initiatives exert on biodiversity protection and promotion of the non-consumptive tourism sector, the creation of opportunities as well as ‘alleviating poverty’ for the local people has been a development myth. While a number of scholars, authorities and development practitioners believe that transboundary conservation initiatives promote ‘socio-economic upliftment’ of local people, reality in the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area has proved otherwise. Because of involuntary displacement or relocation to pave way for such an initiative and in search of better opportunities, local people migrate from the marginal rural areas to towns and cities across international borders where they work as laborers. Using the case of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area, Zimbabwe sector, this paper looks at the urban space as sinks to the rural to urban migration. It argues that this is one of the consequences of the failure to meet objectives of empowering local people by transboundary conservation initiatives.

INTRODUCTION

The Shangaan people will migrate to South Africa if the situation does not improve - Machangani ose, achapera kuinda Joni, kana zvinhu zvikaramba zvakadaiso (Interview with middle aged male a former ward councilor Sengwe, 4 March 2006).

The quotation above by a disgruntled male local leader named Dziva, gives a starting point to further examine the effects of transboundary initiatives such as the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area (GLTFCA) on rural livelihoods. His comment not only reminds us that such conservation initiatives suggest not to promote the socio-economic empowerment of local people but is consistent with development initiatives that some commentators argue that they do not target poverty alleviation. The GLTFCA is a partnership among Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe. It covers an area of approximately 99,800km², and is regarded as the “jewel of the various transboundary conservation areas” in Southern Africa (GKG Conceptual Plan, 2000: 8). The initiative claims to offer among other opportunities, ecological enhancement and economic development. The GLTFCA is based on the concept of peace parks which is vague. Sandwith et al. (2001) define peace parks as “Trans-Boundary Protected Areas (TBPs) … managed through legal or other effective means, which are dedicated both to the conservation of biological and cultural diversity and the promotion of peace and cooperation” (2001: 1).

Because the GLTFCA involve partnerships among three countries, the governance of the natural resources is complex. It complies with the framework for co-operation in the establishment, development and management of trans-border ecosystems is provided by regional bodies such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC). It also comprises other formal institutions (agreements and protocols) binding the parties. Wolmer’s work stands out among many critics on the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Areas governance system. His Transboundary Conservation: The Politics of Ecological Integrity in the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park, 2003, explicitly affirms that the initiative is pursued by the elites who are more powerful (the tourism industry, NGOs, researchers and donors), whom are able “to portray TBNRM [Transboundary Natural Resources Management] as building on their own
experience and thereby to write themselves into the story” (2003: 268). He illustrates that not all capital flows from donors are targeted at supporting conservation but political motives.

A growing body of literature on conservation remarks similar sentiments by local people such as those by Dziva in Sengwe. In Dowie’s Conservation refugees: When Protecting Nature Means Kicking People Out, 2005, alludes to one Maasai leader Martin Saning’o, saying: “We are enemies of conservation” at the November 4 World Conservation Congress in Bangkok (2005: 2). This is neither that he is against the idea behind conservation nor that his constituency was not practicing any conservation activities but the manner in which development initiatives are implemented in the name of conservation that do not benefit but marginalizes and disenfranchise them albeit rhetoric about enhancing local livelihoods.

Responding to similar concerns and many such voices emerging from conservation initiatives worldwide, scholars such as Brockington and Igoe (2006) write: Protest against the experience of displacement and marginalisation by protected areas, against impoverishment and injustice, against disempowerment and disenfranchisement, has become one of the defining features of the politics of protected areas [that include transfrontier conservation initiatives] in the last two decades (2006: 1).vii

Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau make similar calls in their work in Poverty Risks and National Parks: Policy Issues in Conservation and Resettlement (2006) that: The responsibility, in our view, rests now -upon major international NGOs concerned with conservation, such as IUCN, WWF, WCS, CI, and others, to genuinely distance themselves from displacement operations that impoverish people, to form-ally adopt transparent social safeguards regarding involuntary displacement, and to subscribe to pro-poor conservation;viii - upon economists, sociologists, anthropologists, and geographers to intervene with a richer contribution and a stronger voice, helping re-balance the information asymmetry we signaled; and - upon the international community to establish “double sustainability” as an integrated equitable commandment: to sea-rch for pro-poor solutions that raise living standards, rather than impoverishing poor people further, and to reorient the conservation of biodiversity with a renewed understanding and definition of the twofold, intertwined objectives—objectives for conservation integrated with the objectives of enhancing local people’s livelihoods (2006: 1826).

Such calls extend many voices from local people and critics to bring about a paradigm shift in the implementation of Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs) albeit the rhetoric of socio-economic enhancement of local residents claimed by such initiatives. In spite of such calls, implementation of TFCAs continues unabated. Over the past two decades, there has been an increase in the number of TFCA initiatives in the Southern Africa region. See map in appendix 1. Meanwhile at global level, displaced people as a result of conservation initiatives are estimated at 8.5 million (for instance Geisler 2003: 71). In the GLTFCA context, forced relocation dates back to the colonial period of developing conservation fortresses.viii In Sengwe alone, a total of 740 families (about 4,640 people) await relocation to pave way for the GLTFCA’s wildlife corridor known as the Sengwe to Tshipise corridor. Notwithstanding that TFCAs engrave convincingly to politicians, donors and the private sector among many other actors, as panacea to integrating conservation and socio-economic enhancement in southern Africa.

One school of thought suggests that TFCAs are apparatus that seem to contribute towards the “Cape to Cairo” dream by Cecil Rhodes is illustrated by Wolmer (2003) who refers to such authorities pursuing TFCAs as “Cecil Rhode’s clones who want to see a great wedge of green as their legacy to Africa” (2003: 266). Indeed, as local people migrate from their ancestral land to the urban areas they propagate this legacy. More recent work in “Securing Space: Mapping and Fencing in Transfrontier Conservation in Southern Africa, 2006. Spierenburg and Wels, demonstrate with copious documentation how TFCAs facilitate the removal of physical fences separating the protected areas and the communal area, “represent attempts to break down the fences that have hindered community participation in wildlife conservation” (2006: 299), so does Harmon (2006: 209) who argues that this will improve the health of animals.ix

Similarly, when the GLTFCA was established in 2000, legislation required that all settlements
be cleared from the Corridor to reduce human-wildlife and livestock-wildlife conflicts. “In time, all barriers that impede the free movement of animals across current artificial boundaries will be removed and tourists will also have unimpeded access . . .” (GKG Conceptual Plan 2002: 1). Some critics view this as returning to the idea that people and wildlife cannot coexist and that people are a threat to nature (Spierenburg and Milgroom, 2008: 436; Wolmer et al. 2003: 97 for instance). The rationale of the Corridor as suggested by a local NGO called CESVI in its work on Sustainable Development and Natural Resources Management in Southern Zimbabwe: The Sengwe Corridor Concept Paper, 2002, unequivocally states that it is to reestablish lost wildlife migratory routes and create a gene pool for breeding wildlife. Accordingly, the GLTFCA Treaty (2002) suggests that “when the risks of human-animal conflict are high and a fence can resolve this, however, a fence will be erected” (2002: 6). It turned out however that the GLTFCA has not only removed fences in some places but shall erect in others, which shall impact on the livelihoods and participation of local people.

Regardless of verbal information delivered to local people about relocation, it is yet to be carried out. The Zim Standard and Zimbabwe Situation, 2006, describes this situation in the GLTFCA Zimbabwe sector as: Security concerns are threatening the progress of the Great Limpopo Trans Frontier Park amid reports that the Zimbabwean government does not have land to resettle villagers from Sengwe. The Governor for Masvingo, Willard Chiwewe, said the government wants the villagers out but admitted that would take longer than expected because they do not have land to relocate them. “We will remove them as soon as we have an alternative place to relocate them. Right now we do not have the actual land,” Chiwewe said.

Fears are that their stay could create security concerns chief among which would be fueling poaching and increased animal and human conflicts. National Parks and Wildlife Authority public relations officer, Major Edward Mbewe, said they are keen to see the community leaving. “As Parks we want them out. We have reserved that area as an extensive zone for the rhino,” Mbewe said (20 February 2006).

Here, the inconclusive situation about relocation is shown. What is more pressing though is that local people are aware that relocation shall take place but because it is not finalized have a challenge in planning their lives. A statement by a disgruntled middle aged male in Pahlela that: “We do not know what there is for us in this transfrontier - A hiti viti kuri yini shahina/ ahitivi kuri hingaphuneka hiyini kona kwale, reflect this uncertainty.” I tend to think along Scott (1985) that migration can be viewed as a form of everyday resistance. He argues that it is important to consider the context in which individual agents are looked at. That is the socio-economic and political environments that shape those contexts, and bringing out the interpretations placed by them. It has been found that people tend to disobey, or only obey out of fear, laws that are inconsistent with social norms while obeying laws that reflect social norms.

In the mean time, the European Union committed €10 million for the construction of a veterinary fence in the GLTFCA arena. Once completed, the veterinary fence between the Gonarezhou (Zimbabwe) and Kruger National Park (South Africa), shall separate part of the Sengwe communal area from the core conservation area. The fence, an elephant proof physical barrier, shall prevent animal movements across the conservation area and Sengwe communal landscapes and control the spread of wildlife diseases to livestock. Indeed it shall also impede on human activities in that local practices in the park will be stopped. There it stands symbolic of the dividing line between local people and the park’s authorities, evoking the colonial scene of segregating the locals from the settlers. Overlooking the local area of Sengwe, there it stands boastfully, unshaken, and safeguarding the territory of the authorities.

Using the case of the GLTFCA, Sengwe prefecture in the Zimbabwe, this paper illustrates that not only do volatile political transitions have consequences on migration but figuratively speaking, the depoliticized development of transfrontier conservation initiatives that are non-violent do. This, as I shall show brings up an increase in the number of conservation refugees in southern Africa region as a consequence of the establishment of TFCAs. Thus they force local people to migrate to towns and cities seeking for better opportunities thereby creating an image of the urban space as sinks to absorb the disenfranchised. Further I show that the GLTFCA, is undoubtedly a cultural construction that not only
provide a framework for the commoditization of wildlife but with profound socio-cultural, political and ideological influences and underpinnings that function (albeit unintentionally) to exclude local people.

**METHODOLOGY**

This research was carried out during fieldwork for my postgraduate studies in Sengwe communal land, Zimbabwe in 2006 and 2007. I stayed in four villages namely Dumisa, Sengwe, Kotsvi and Chilohlela, for a total of 8 months (respectively 2, 3, 2 and 1 months), where I conducted group discussions, open ended interviews with key informants, a questionnaire survey, transect walks and participant observation. As originally intended in the conceptual framework for the research, I selected research sites (villages) where the populations were living within and adjacent the proposed 393 km² wildlife corridor. The idea of selecting critical cases is encouraged in the actor-oriented perspectives (Hammersley and Atkinson 1983; Long and Long 1992; Steins 1999) and the approach is an appropriate way of capturing context specific detail.xiv I administered a total of 121 questionnaires in the four villages looking at various aspects of the GLTFCA including sources of livelihoods for the local people.

I also consulted other sources of evidence such as literature reviews in order to capture the conservation discourse and practices of the different actors (actor oriented) at local level. As participatory methods were applied, validation of collected data with different local groups in Sengwe and with government, private sector and non-governmental officials was performed.

**RESULTS**

Sengwe is located in the southeastern region of Chiredzi district, Masvingo province in Zimbabwe. The area is situated in Natural Region 4 and 5, characterized by unreliable rainfall with a mean annual of about 400mm and mean annual temperature of 32°C (1993: 2).xv Three ethnic groups live together in Sengwe. The Shangaan people constitute about 70% of the total population with the Ndebele and Shona constituting 26% and 4% respectively (ARDA 1993: 8). The Ndebele and Shona speaking groups were relocated to Sengwe by the colonial government as mandated by the Land Appropriation Acts of the 1890s. My respondents in the Corridor said that there are five major livelihoods options in Sengwe. These are dry land crop production constituting 82% of households, livestock production (76%), migrant labor (55%) to South Africa and Mozambique, marketing of non timber forest products (49%), consisting palm leaves, palm wine, wild fruit and Mopane worms and hunting (13%).xvi

With more than 86% of household depending on agro-pastoral activities as major livelihoods, one challenge is how they can be integrated into the GLTFCA’s wildlife-tourism sector (for example, Cumming 2004). Proposals drawn by authorities to compensate livelihoods loss include the resuscitation and increasing irrigated land. There are thirteen irrigation schemes that cover a total area of 330,6ha and directly benefit 1553 farmers (AGRITEX 2006). Only two (15.4%) of these irrigation schemes are fully operational while eleven are at various stages of resuscitation (Interview, CESVI staff, Davata, 20 November 2006). Because of the socio-economic and political challenges in Zimbabwe, unemployment in the Corridor is 92.5%.xvii This high level of unemployment among other factors contributes to labor migration to neighboring countries such as Mozambique and South Africa to seek for better opportunities.xviii

In the Sengwe prefecture even the population figures are elusive. For instance, CESVI (2002) estimates the population of Sengwe at 22,140 while AREX (2002) records a figure of 21,766 during the same period. I, however, adopt the AREX records as they are based on the village records that are kept by local leaders unlike those derived from a survey by CESVI. In 2006, AREX estimates the total number of households as 3,090 and the population at 17,797 reflecting a decrease in population by about 18.2%. Although I never found out the reasons for this decrease in population, migration was not mentioned as a contributing factor. This is because household records include absentee family or household members as resident in Sengwe. It turned out that such figures are used to determine quantities for food handouts to households during feminine. One elderly woman explained to me that: “So we can have a bigger ration of food that can last. We will not go hungry quickly.”xix Given that migrant labor is one source of livelihood contributing to 55% households translates to about 1,700...
households. This percentage is more than what writers such as Tevera (2002) and Zinyama (2002) who look at migration in Zimbabwe. Statistics show that about 40-60% of the 23,500 economically active Zimbabweans migrated to South Africa 1980 and 1997 (2002: 17).

**DISCUSSION**

Looking at the Sengwe figure, which is about (on average) 14.4% of total migrants to South Africa, migration is therefore more profound. He also observes that since the late 1980s “there has developed a large flow of informal cross-border trading by low-income people, especially women, who travel to South Africa to purchase goods for subsequent resale when they return to Zimbabwe” (2002: 18). He attributes this to the deteriorating political environment and economic decline in Zimbabwe as the major causes to this increase in migration to South Africa. This has proved to be true in the Sengwe prefecture.

During my fieldwork, I was invited for a meeting at the local chief’s residence (Chief Sengwe). I travelled from Davata business centre which is about 6kms away with a former ward councilor for Sengwe ward known as Dziva. As we walked along the dirty road, suddenly two one-tone open trucks bearing South African registered number plates emerged in front of us and passed leaving a choking cloud of dust that took time to clear. They both towed trailers which were full of Shangaan bags as they are commonly known. Dziva explained:

*These people are called Malaicha.* They are in this freight business ferrying groceries and other things bought by locals [Sengwe people] working in South Africa. Locals who work in South Africa assist their families here by supplying necessities. They pay the freight services and deliveries are made to the door. My son Misheck sent us some groceries and clothes for his daughter we look after. Surely, our children help us a lot (4 March 2006).

Because of the limited opportunities in the Corridor, local people migrate to neighboring countries to work. They purchase necessities and freight them to their families where they are scarce and when available are expensive. More profound from the perspective of this paper however, is that the controversial *Zimbabwe Economic Structural Adjustment Programme* (ESAP) generated consequences that impacted negatively on poverty levels (see OPEV 1997). Among others they include: Exacerbated the poverty especially in rural areas such that it “became a way of life”; the depreciation of the Zimbabwean dollar; a decline in the Growth Domestic Product (GDP) and employment creation (OPEV 1997: 25-30). It is partly that these consequences already contributed to the urban to rural migration as loss of jobs due to retrenchment and difficult conditions of survival in urban areas became worse. As a result of ESAP, “Zimbabwe has become a far more significant exporter of migrant labor as economic conditions in Zimbabwe have deteriorated” (Crush and Tevera 2002: 2).

A significant proportion of households (55%) in Sengwe rely on the combination of agricultural and non-agricultural income sources, often involving remittances from migrant labor, the effects of ESAP negatively impacted on the livelihoods options of local people. Khosla (1999) asserts that the link between migration and poverty is extremely complex and that population movement is often linked to lack of assets other than households’ and individuals’ own labour (1999: 17). He argues that “following the implementation of structural adjustment programmes and economic reform, [in southern Africa region], it is thought that a number of retrenched formal sector urban workers may engage in urban-rural migration and return to “home” areas where the cost of living is lower (1999: 18). This has been the opposite in Sengwe. Respondents said that when retrenchments were made during the period 1992-1996, more residents moved from the cities in Zimbabwe and crossed into South Africa and Mozambique to seek better opportunities in farms, mines and urban centers. For instance one elderly woman said:

*Business was no longer profitable for the construction company that employed my husband in Bulawayo. The number of projects kept on going down. In 1996, the company finally closed down and my husband was retrenched. He came here with his belongings and immediately migrated to South Africa [Johannesburg] where he worked as a fuel attendant at a garage for 10 years until he retired (Interview with elderly woman, Malipati 2006).*

That said migration can also be viewed to provide an escape from consequences of conservation initiatives that fail to achieve their de-
sirable objectives to improve the socio-economic status of local people in the Sengwe prefecture. It is within this context nine years after its establishment, the GLTFCA is yet to deliver its promises of socio-economic benefits accruing to local people, which include the creation of employment in the tourism industry.

Development Perspectives

Bond (2001) systematically challenges the top-down approaches to development by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and The World Bank in Africa. Looking at the cases in Angola, South Africa, Malawi, Mozambique, Lesotho, Zambia and Zimbabwe, he illustrates how interventions result in creating conflicts among actors, influencing policy reforms and disadvantaging local people. He asserts that the funding of the initiatives is not aimed at furthering the causes of racial equality, economic justice, and ecological sustainability, but on the contrary promoting external interests (2001: 234-235). In a similar vein Williams (2007), argues that the justification for the Bank’s activities is that “economic relations are natural, hence its capital injection into development initiatives and is not a way of imposing hegemony but “assisting in what is a natural course of development” (2007: 97).

In the case of the GLTFCA, the World Bank funds the initiative through the GEF. Brockington and Igoe (2006) note that many governments in developing countries “are also significantly dependent on external funding and AID money” (2006: 8). It thereby reduces their bargaining power for the conditional granting of such aid. But who is responsible for the consequences of such initiatives? Otherwise, who should mitigate what effect and to what extent?

In discussing on how the demarcation of international boundaries were made in the West Africa prefecture in The Making of the Boundaries: Focus on West Africa, 1985, Hargreaves, demonstrates how different actors interacted with each other resulting in the generation of conflicts that had consequences on the livelihoods of the weaker actors. To describe this effect, he uses a Ugandan metaphor that says: “When two elephants meet, it is the grass that suffers” (1985: 19). This metaphor also applies in this paper within the context of TFCAs to illustrate their effects on the livelihoods of the weaker actors (local people) and how it redefines the landscape, not only in terms of power but geographical area in the GLTFCA prefecture.

In spite of the existence of bilateral relations between South Africa and Zimbabwe, Sengwe residents go well beyond the stipulated distance of no more than 20km into South Africa. They travel through unofficial channels as far as Cape Town to sell their wares and seek employment. And in other cases acquire official registration papers and permanently settle there. Dziva said that: You see, our children have no problems speaking the South African Shaangan. So, they can easily get papers [birth certificates, identification and passports] without any problems” (4 March 2006).

Even in terms of policy, both the colonial and inherently, the post colonial governments recedes authority on conservation from the local level. As observed by a number of authors in conservation discourse, the nature of the policies and legislature imposed by the colonial rule and seemingly by the post colonial rule, local structures have perpetually continued to lose their jurisprudence and led to hostility towards conservation initiatives. Nonetheless, this loss of authority is indeed, a loss of recognition not just by the governance structure of the GLTFCA but by the state, rendering them vulnerable to conservation initiatives.

CONCLUSION

My paper looked at the Sengwe wildlife corridor which is a section of the GLTFCA. I discussed the effect of the initiative on the migration by local people to neighboring countries because of lack of benefits that it claims on their livelihoods. I am aware that relocation of people has been going on since 1945 due the planting of landmines (Weyl 1999: 3), and to give way to commercial agriculture and wildlife management (Cumming et al. 2007: 12-14; Spenceley 2006: 8,11). In the Zimbabwe sector, I am also aware of the controversial land reforms that started in 2000 and its effects not only on the agriculture sector but on the socio-economic and politics at national level (For instance, Chaumba et al. 2003; Deininger et al. 2000; Human Rights Watch 2002; Kinsey 2004; Mavedzenge et al. 2006; Moyo 1995, 1999; Rukuni 1994; Wolmer et al. 2003).

Writers such as Wolmer et al. (2003), remind us that “wildlife does not combine well with other
land uses - particularly those that involve the presence of people" (2003: 97). One man and local leader says: “This is about wildlife liberation and more suffering to us”.

In a similar vein, Fakir’s speech at an Inwent-IUCN Workshop on Transfrontier Conservation Areas in Southern Africa into Guidance and Networking (18-20 June), entitled, From Sweet Talk to Delivery: Community Participation in Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs), 2003, argues that: “TFCAs can easily transform themselves from monuments of prosperity to exclusion and abandonment of the hopes of many of the poor who have tied or anchored their future to these vehicles of resource mobilization and development” (2003: 1). "The closest metaphor to approximate the fears and feelings of powerlessness" he adds “that marginal people or people without means experience from TFCAs where monumental initiatives of potential ‘displacement’ [in the Corridor] take place at their door step is that of the experiences with Large dams” (2003: 2-3).

In the Sengwe prefecture, the GLTFCA has exacerbated the generation of conservation refugees as local people fail to derive any benefits from, “principally via the economic incentives of hunting and ecotourism revenues” as claimed in its policy (see Wolmer 2003: 266), hence, has acted as a driver to the emigration of local people to other countries namely Mozambique and South Africa in search of better opportunities. As Escobar (1995) has observed: “The fact that most people’s conditions did not improve but deteriorated with the passing of time did not seem to bother most experts” (1995: 5), relocations, disenfranchisement and rural to urban migration continues unabated, so do discourses in conservation and development.

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NOTES

1. The total area is divided into approximately 66,000 km² in Mozambique, 22,000 km² in South Africa, and 12,000 km² in Zimbabwe (Peace parks 2002).
4. See also Brockington and Igloe (2005) and Chapin (2004).
5. Griffin et al. (1999), in their work in Transboundary Natural Resource Management in Southern Africa, 1991, define Protected Areas (PAs) as area an of land officially set aside by a government for the purposes of ecological or cultural conservation; such lands are generally owned and managed by the state (1999: 1).
6. “The closest metaphor to approximate the fears and feelings of powerlessness” he adds “that marginal people or people without means experience from TFCAs where monumental initiatives of potential ‘displacement’ [in the Corridor] take place at their door step is that of the experiences with Large dams” (2003: 2-3).
7. Community participation is problematic because it is based on the naive and yet problematic concept of community. In conservation discourse, many authors note that it assumes the existence of cohesion, uniformity of reasoning, shared vision among members and cooperation among individuals and in subgroups, which is elusive. See (Murphree 2001; Leach et al. 1996; Thornton and Ramphele 1988; Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Boonzier and Sharp 1998).
8. Conservation refugees are defined by Dowie (2005) as people “removed from their lands involuntarily, either forcibly or through a variety of less coercive measures” (2005: 2).
9. “The closest metaphor to approximate the fears and feelings of powerlessness” he adds “that marginal people or people without means experience from TFCAs where monumental initiatives of potential ‘displacement’ [in the Corridor] take place at their door step is that of the experiences with Large dams” (2003: 2-3).
12. Zimbabwe is divided into five agricultural ecological zones based on agriculture production potential, soils and rainfall patterns with region 1 having the highest agriculture potential and 5 the least.
13. Hunting and stream bank cultivation are illegal in the GLTFCA and Zimbabwe prefecture.
14. "The fact that most people’s conditions did not improve but deteriorated with the passing of time did not seem to bother most experts" (1995: 5), relocations, disenfranchisement and rural to urban migration continues unabated, so do discourses in conservation and development.
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For example Brockington and Igoe (2006) argue that “conceptually development-induced and conserva-tion-induced displacement are indistinguishable, either from the perspective of the state …, or from the point of view of people evicted (2006: 11).”

See also Jabs (2007: 1498) who uses the metaphor to describe conflicts among pastoralists in Karamoja, Uganda where cattle raiding are rampant.


See Cernea (2005) for details.

Interview, elderly male local leader, Malipati, 15 August, 2006.

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10. Appendix A. TFCAs in Southern Africa region

Fig. 1. Transfrontier conservation areas identified in SADC.
Source: SADC 2009